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Commentators have written a great deal in recent years about 
management resistance to takeover bids. Some believe that manage-
ment's decision to oppose a tender offer is an ordinary business judg-
ment, entitled to the protection of the "business judgment rule." 1 
Others claim that target company management ought not be afforded 
such latitude, arguing that this application of the business judgment 
rule is illogical, inconsistent with Congress' goals in adopting the Wil-
liams Act, and, given the functions performed by tender offers, ulti-
mately unwise. 2 
Participants in this debate have generally avoided very close scru-
tiny of particular defensive tactics employed by target managements. 
Thus while the literature addresses, in a rather cursory way, the pro-
priety of certain defenses, 3 most of the discussion focuses on the broad 
question of management resistance in general. There is, in particular, 
little analysis of litigation against the tender off eror, 4 a tactic that tar-
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1. See, e.g., Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979); 
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 
1017 (1981) [hereinafter Lipton II]; Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a 
Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 CORP. L. REV. 107 (1980); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's 
Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (1980); 
see also authorities cited at note 155 infra. 
2. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding 
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the 
Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 1 
(1978); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in 
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981). 
3. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 2, at 826-31. But see Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensfre Stock 
Repurchases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1377 (1986) (providing extended analysis of one defensive tactic, 
target stock repurchases). 
4. Some commentators, for example, almost casually lump target litigation together with 
other takeover defenses they would simply bar as inimical to shareholder welfare. See, e.g., Eas-
terbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 1192-94; see also Gilson, supra note 2, at 878-79. In a recent 
article, however, Gregg Jarrell did examine the impact of target litigation on the wealth of target 
shareholders. Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a 
Merge?, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 151 (1985). I discuss Jarrell's analysis at notes 92-143 infra and accom-
panying text. 
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get managers commonly employ5 with considerable effectiveness. 6 My 
purpose here is to fill this void by analyzing the use of such litigation 
by target company managements. 
It is well known, of course, that target managers commonly re-
spond to unwanted takeover bids7 by suing the bidder.8 But why, ex-
actly, do target managers sue? Gregg Jarrell, until recently Chief 
Economist of the Securities and Exchange Commission, believes that 
they may do so in order to get a better deal for their shareholders. 
Thus, he has suggested that "the goal of [litigious] target management 
is to increase the takeover price . . . . [M]ost target litigation should be 
viewed as a value-maximizing gamble undertaken by managers in the 
best interests of their shareholders."9 
Jarrell's thesis is important and provocative, for it suggests that a 
very common takeover defensive measure - litigation - should be 
viewed favorably by those concerned with the welfare of target share-
holders. In this respect, he contradicts the claims of others that target 
management's freedom to resist hostile bids should be severely 
curtailed. 10 
In this Article, I shall offer a view of target litigation quite different 
from Jarrell's. I argue that target managers generally sue bidders in 
order to thwart takeover attempts and, more important, often sµcceed, 
thus maintaining their control over the target. This result, I shall ar-
gue, is hardly in the best interests of target shareholders or, for that 
matter, society at large. I therefore conclude that target lawsuits 
5. See notes 12-20 & 36-40 infra and accompanying text. 
6. See notes 65-82 infra and accompanying text. 
7. By "unwanted takeover bids," I mean those in which target management has announced 
its opposition. I also refer to such bids occasionally as "hostile," "contested," or "unfriendly" 
bids. 
8. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 266-67 (1973); 
E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSfEIN, DEVELOPME1''TS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPO-
RATE CONTROL 104-92 (1977); 1 A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, 
AND PLANNING 119-44 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1985); 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKE-
OVERS & FREEZEOUTS § 6.07 (1986); S. LoRNE, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED 
AND CONTESTED TRANSACTIONS§ 4.05[3][b][i] (1985); see also notes 17-20 infra and accompa-
nying text (describing empirical evidence of the frequency of target litigation). 
Target lawsuits are many and varied. For example, targets often assert violations of federal 
and state securities laws, federal antitrust laws, federal margin requirements, federal and state 
change-of-control restrictions and, most recently, federal anti-racketeering laws. See generally E. 
ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSfEIN, supra, at 107-93 (surveying target lawsuit claims and 
standing issues); 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra, at 144-47 (discussing target litigation under the Racke-
teer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
See also notes 37-41 infra and accompanying text. 
9. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 152-53. 
10. See, e.g., Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 
229 (1986); Baron, Tender Offers and Management Resistance, 38 J. FIN. 331, 342 (1983); Eas-
terbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 1198; Gilson, supra note 2, at 878-79; Bebchuk, The Case for 
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1029 (1982). 
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should be viewed with suspicion and perhaps subjected to rules 
designed to limit the harm such lawsuits can cause. 11 
In Part I, I explore the motives of litigious target managers. I 
briefly examine the takeover defense literature and empirical evidence 
regarding the frequency of target litigation, both of which indicate that 
target managers usually sue bidders in order to defeat unwanted take-
over attempts. I also suggest that judicial reactions to target lawsuits 
largely confirm this hypothesis. 
I then discuss, in Part II, target management's conflict of interest 
in control contests and the particular strategic considerations that lead 
target managers to sue hostile bidders. I argue that target litigation is 
peculiarly likely to be frivolous and, based on a study of successful 
target defenses, show that litigation often repels unwanted bids. This 
result, empirical studies demonstrate, adversely affects target share-
holder wealth and, I suggest, undermines an optimal allocation of cor-
porate resources. 
I conclude in Part III by proposing reforms that would limit harm-
ful target litigation without unduly restricting the ability of target 
managers to seek redress for legally cognizable wrongs. I also suggest 
that the benefits that Jarrell attributes to target litigation can be pre-
served cheaply and effectively under the approach that I propose. 
I. THE GOAL OF TARGET LAWSUITS: WHY Do TARGET 
MANAGERS SUE? 
Plaintiffs ordinarily file lawsuits with the goal of obtaining relief 
from allegedly illegal conduct by defendants. One might therefore as-
sume that targets sue bidders in order to prevent or remedy unlawful 
tender offers or tender offer practices. Nevertheless, there are a 
number of reasons for concluding that target managers often sue bid-
ders in order to impede unwanted offers, with little concern whether 
their lawsuits assert meritorious legal claims. First, specialists in the 
strategy of control contests commonly urge the commencement of liti-
gation as a means of thwarting unwanted tender offers. Indeed, the 
literature suggests that these specialists view target litigation as a vir-
tually automatic response by any management team wishing to resist a 
takeover attempt. 
For example, one lawyer observes that litigation against the bidder 
11. Target lawsuits generally assert claims on behalf of the target company, not its managers 
individually. Nevertheless, these actions are usually instituted by managers as part of an overall 
strategy designed to defeat the takeover bid and thereby thwart their displacement as managers. 
See Part I infra. Thus, when I refer to target management lawsuits, I will be employing a short· 
hand that is technically inaccurate but arguably reflects the reality of target litigation against 
hostile bidders. 
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is "axiomatic." "[I]t's obviously something that always gets done 
••• " 12 Another notes that target managers 
almost always will run to court claiming that the [tender] offer is in vio-
lation of the Williams Act, the federal antitrust laws, and any other laws 
imaginative counsel can discover .... 
. . . [I]t has become a reflex action for a target company to combat an 
offeror by alleging violations of section 14(e) - the antifraud provision 
of the Williams Act .... 
. . . Antitrust claims are often raised whether or not the circum-
stances warrant it. 13 
Similarly, some have urged target managers to consider the use of def-
amation actions against the bidder's management "as a weapon in cor-
porate control battles."14 And even scholars further removed from the 
fray of control contests have stated flatly that "[ o ]ne of the most effec-
tive defensive strategies is to invoke the aid of courts."15 In view of 
these examples, the following observation by the authors of a leading 
text on securities regulation seems apt: "Almost without exception, 
any announcement of a takeover bid is now instantly followed by an 
injunction action filed by the corporate management charging the 
12. Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433, 1437 (1977). It is 
significant that the author is senior partner of a prominent law firm that specializes in mergers 
and acquisitions, particularly hostile tender offers. 
13. Liman, Has the Tender Movement Gone Too Far?, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 687, 688, 689, 
696-97 (1978). Liman describes "what seems to be the current prevailing philosophy of the Bar 
- namely, that filing a lawsuit at the commencement of a tender offer should be an 'automatic' 
response." Id. at 690 n.15. 
Another pair of takeover specialists have stated that "it is the unusual case where some kind 
of lawsuit cannot be filed." Reuben & Elden, How to be a Target Company, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 423, 437 (1978). Nevertheless, these authors caution that targets "should not automati-
cally sue in response to a tender offer. A target should not sue if it has no colorable claim .••. 
Judges are becoming increasingly sophisticated about the use, and misuse, of lawsuits in tender 
offers .... " Id. at 437-38; see note 23 infra. 
14. Arthur, Kirby & Rein, Defamation Suits as a Weapon in Corporate Control Battles, 31 
Bus. LAW. 1 (1981). The authors decry the increased tendency of courts to hold that "state 
securities statutes are preempted by federal securities laws" and to read "federal securities and 
antitrust statutes less expansively,'' concluding that "participants in heated control battles have 
good reason to consider new litigation alternatives, including defamation actions." Id. at 3. The 
article is replete with examples suggesting the authors' attitude toward target litigation. They 
note, for instance, that "[i]n corporate control battles, initiation oflitigation often is motivated as 
much by short term or tactical considerations as by the prospects of long-term relief on the 
merits." Id. at 8. Thus, they point out that "[a]lmost any plausible cause of action threatens 
[the] opponent with burden, delay, and expense,'' which they applaud as "a valuable means of 
enhancing an opponent's apparent level of risk." Id. at 11. Similarly, they extol the tactical 
value of "expedited and wide-ranging discovery" in takeover litigation, observing that quite apart 
from its relevance to the merits of the case, discovery "may provide insight into an opponent's 
tactics and useful 'ammunition' in the form of unfavorable information, and also may burden an 
opponent at a time of otherwise intense demands." Id. at 10. 
15. Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 
1155, 1155 (1982). 
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'raider' with most of the crimes in the Decalogue, but usually stopping 
short of statutory rape." 16 
Empirical studies of target litigation are consistent with the propo-
sition that target managers often use lawsuits against the bidder as a 
tactical device for resisting an unwanted offer. For example, I con-
ducted a study of takeover contests in which I examined management 
responses to tender offers over a recent three-and-a-half year period. 
In a sample of ninety-five hostile bids, I found that sixty (sixty-three 
percent) elicited target lawsuits following announcement of the tender 
offer.17 
Similarly, in his recent article examining the effect of antitakeover 
litigation on the wealth of target shareholders, Gregg Jarrell reported 
that targets litigate in at least one-third of all takeover attempts, in-
16. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 671 (5th ed. 1982) (footnote omit-
ted). The omitted footnote is worth quoting in its entirety: "In reading some of the cases, one 
has the feeling that the complaint may have been drafted in advance with the name of the defen-
dant left blank, to be filled in as the occasion may require." Id. at 671 n.I; see also R. GILSON, 
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 642 (1986) ("The single most common 
response to an unwanted offer is litigation."); Cohn, Tender Offers and the Sale of Control: A11 
Analogue to Determine the Validity of Target Management Defe11sive Measures, 66 IOWA L. REV. 
475, 487 (1981) ("Immediate initiation of litigation seeking a preliminary injunction against the 
tender offer proceeding has been almost a knee-jerk reaction in hostile takeover situations."); E. 
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 8, at 266 (''There are very few contested tender offers 
where the target will not consider legal action as a method of resisting the offerer's advances."); 
S. LoRNE, supra note 8, at § 4.05[3][b][i] ("Invariably, the first tactic to be employed by the 
subject company will be litigation .... [T]he very existence of hard-fought litigation may be 
thought to have some in terrorem value ... . "); H. KR!PKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLO-
SURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 270 (1979) (describing tender offer litigation as 
"necessarily a game, a series of litigating tactics with teams ready to fly into action at the first 
sign of a tender offer, ... [where] the concept of law as a system of justice is totally irrelevant"). 
17. For this study, I began by compiling from the SEC News Digest a list of all Schedules 
14D-I filed between January 1, 1982, and June 1, 1985. The result was a collection of 364 tender 
offers. I then conducted a search of the NEXIS database for stories on each tender offer. (The 
NEXIS service, owned and operated by Mead Data Central, provides on-line access to 137 news-
paper, magazine, wire service, and newsletter files.) I was able to locate stories for 263 of the 
tender offers. The stories revealed that target management favored the bid in 138 cases and 
announced its opposition in 95; in 30 cases management's position was neutral or unclear. I 
further determined from the stories that target managers filed a lawsuit against the bidder in 60 
of the 95 cases in which management opposed the bid. (Note that I characterized management's 
position by reference to its initial response to the takeover bid. Thus, takeover attempts in which 
the target managers ultimately acceded to the initial or a subsequent bidder were defined as 
hostile if target management's first response was opposition.) The results of this study are on file 
with the Michigan Law Review. 
Note that my study necessarily omitted tender offers for which no Schedule 14D-1 was filed 
(le., tender offers for shares not registered under the 1934 Act. See Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, § 14(d)(I), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982)). In addition, tender offers not reported in NEXIS 
files were excluded. Since takeover contests may be more newsworthy than uncontested acquisi-
tions, my sample may reflect a selection bias in favor of hostile bids. On the other hand, I did 
find more accounts of friendly than unfriendly bids. My study, moreover, focused on hostile 
bids, so any selection bias in favor of such cases seems unimportant. 
It is also worth noting that my sample consists of very recent bids. This is significant in view 
of the assertion by some takeover specialists that the incidence of target litigation has declined 
dramatically in the last few years. See note 31 infra. 
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eluding those that are unopposed by target management.18 If, as my 
study suggests, roughly thirty-six percent of all tender offers are con-
tested by target management, 19 Jarrell's data indicate that resistant 
target managers almost always sue.20 
Given the strategic advice that takeover specialists commonly of-
fer21 and the complexity of the claims typically asserted in such ac-
tions,22 it is difficult to resist the conclusion that targets sue bidders 
almost reflexively as a defensive response against unwanted offers. 23 
18. See Jarrell, supra note 4, at 160-61. 
19. A recent study by the SEC's Office of the Chief Economist reports that initially negoti-
ated bids accounted for 56% of all tender offers made from 1981 through 1984. See OFFICE OF 
THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, THE EcONOMICS OF ANY-OR-ALL, PARTIAL, AND Two-TIER TENDER 
OFFERS, table lb (Apr. 19, 1985) [hereinafter STUDY OF THE CHIEF EcONOMIST]. According to 
the SEC's data, at most 44% of all tender offers are hostile; if we assume that target managers are 
neutral in at least some cases (my study suggests that management's position is neutral or unclear 
in about 11 % of all cases), then the SEC's data and mine are quite consistent. 
20. Indeed, in explaining his study, Jarrell has stated that he "treat[ed] litigation as defining 
hostility; if target managers don't sue, then they are not hostile to my way of thinking." Letter 
from Gregg A. Jarrell (Mar. 21, 1986) (emphasis in original) (on file with the Michigan Law 
Review). Of course, Jarrell's methodology makes impossible any meaningful extrapolation of 
litigation rates from his data; by defining hostility as synonymous with litigation, he obviously 
assured a litigation rate of 100% in hostile takeover cases. My data suggest that, at least since 
1981, resistant target managers do not always litigate, although they apparently still do so with 
great frequency (i.e., 63% of the time). , 
21. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text. But see note 23 infra. 
22. See note 8 supra & notes 36-40 infra and accompanying text. 
23. This may be changing, as target managers resort with increasing frequency to so-called 
structural defenses such as recapitalizations, stock repurchases, and asset sales. See Coffee, 
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. l, 6-7, 43-
44, 52-60 (1986); see also note 31 infra (noting the observation of some takeover lawyers that 
targets are relying less on litigation as a defensive measure). 
It is also worth noting that some specialists are careful to counsel target managers who do sue 
to assert only meritorious, bona fide claims. While these specialists recognize the tactical value 
of litigation, they clearly reject the use of litigation for purely tactical reasons. See, e.g., 1 A. 
FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 299 & n.22; Reuben & Elden, supra note 13, at 437-38. 
Lawyers, of course, are forbidden from filing groundless or tactically motivated lawsuits. For 
example, rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name .... The signature of an 
attorney ... constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other 
paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable 
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for 
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation .... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this 
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed it ... an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party 
or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the plead-
ing, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See generally Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litiga-
tion by Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300 (1986) [hereinafter Note, 
Dynamics of Rule 11]. Lawyers are similarly constrained by professional ethical obligations. See 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-109, DR 7-102(A)(l), (2), EC 2-30, 7-4 
(1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.16(a){l), 3.1, 3.2, 4.4 (1983); see 
also Note, A Lawyer's Duty to Reject Groundless Litigation, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1561 (1980). 
More broadly, lawyers who help target managers resist takeover bids may face a serious 
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Judicial reactions to target lawsuits suggest that courts recognize 
the tactical nature of much anti-takeover litigation.24 For example, in 
D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway, 25 the Court referred expressly to the 
litigants' attempt "to use this court to further [their] objective[s]" in 
"a struggle ... over the control of" the target company.26 The court 
denied the target's motion for a preliminary injunction against the bid-
der, reasoning that "[m]anagement is simply trying to protect its en-
trenched position and, while its attackers must obey the securities 
laws, enforcement of those laws is, with rare exceptions, best left to the 
SEC or to the [target] stockholders .... "27 Similarly, Judge Friendly 
has warned that "district judges must be vigilant against resort to the 
courts on trumped up or trivial grounds as a means for delaying and 
thereby defeating legitimate tender offers."28 Plainly, judges are grow-
conflict of interest. Under both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, corporate counsel represents the corporate entity, rather than its 
directors, officers or shareholders. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 
(1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (1983). It is unclear whether 
these standards permit a lawyer to advise managers regarding tender offer defensive measures if it 
appears that the interests of the managers and their shareholders conflict. See note 35 infra and 
accompanying text (discussing target management's conflict of interest). This question, part of 
the larger problem of defining the obligations of corporate counsel, is remarkably difficult, and 
beyond the scope of this Article. It is interesting, however, that one noted commentator believes 
that "[t]he discrepancy between [reality] and the standards set forth by the Model Rules of Pro· 
fessional Responsibility [and their predecessors] is substantial." R. GILSON, supra note 16, at 
650. See generally Schuchman, Relations Between Lawyers, in ETHICS AND ADVOCACY 73 
(American Trial Lawyers Foundation 1978); Cary, Professional Responsibility in the Practice of 
Corporation Law: The Murky Divide Between Right and Wrong, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL· 
!TY OF THE LAWYER 27, 29-30 (N. Galston ed. 1977); G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE 
OF LAW 47-57 (1978); Rotunda, Law, Lawyers and Managers, in THE ETHICS OF CORPORATE 
CONDUCT 127, 133-34 (C. Walton ed. 1977); Patterson, A Preliminary Rationalization of the Law 
of Legal Ethics, 57 N.C. L. REV. 519, 522 (1979); Van Dusen, Who Is Counsel's Corporate Client, 
31 Bus. LAW. at 474 (1975); Pierce, The Code of Professional Responsibility in the Corporate 
World: An Abdication of Professional Self-Regulation, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 350, 356-67 (1973); 
Note, Developments in the Law - Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. Rev. 
1244, 1334-43 (1981). 
24. See generally 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 298-99. 
25. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
26. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,562. 
27. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,562. 
28. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Control Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 
1969). Judge Friendly's concern with the tactical use oflitigation is evident throughout his opin· 
ion. For example, following the statement quoted above, he noted that "Congress intended [the 
Williams Act] to assure basic honesty and fair dealing, not to impose an unrealistic requirement 
of laboratory conditions that might make the new statute a potent tool for incumbent manage· 
ment to protect its own interests against the desires and welfare of the stockholders." 409 F.2d at 
948. 
The warnings in Electronic Specialty that target managers may resort to litigation for purely 
tactical reasons have been quoted approvingly by many courts, indicating increasing judicial 
awareness of this phenomenon. See, e.g., Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Intl., Inc., 600 
F.2d 355, 363 (2d Cir. 1979); Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realty, Inc., 599 F.2d 
1140, 1148 (2d Cir. 1979); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388, 397 
(8th Cir. 1976); Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1085 (5th Cir. 
1970); American Gen. Corp. v. NLT Corp., (1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 
October 1986] Target Litigation 117 
ing less patient with this defensive tactic; they are wary of frivolous 
claims and critical of target management attempts to wage control 
contests in the courts.29 
98,808 at 94,142 (S.D. Tex. July l, 1982); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 416 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 527 F. Supp. 86, 99 (E.D.N.Y.), affd., 665 F.2d 
10 (2d Cir. 1981); Connecticut Gen. Mortgage & Realty Inv. v. Siddall, [1981-1982 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1f 98,409 at 92,448 (D. Mass. July 14, 1981); Crouse-Hinds Co. 
v. InterNorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 416, 456 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Hi-
Shear Indus., 503 F. Supp. 1122, 1126, 1136 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 
423 F. Supp. 199, 207-08, 212 (D. Md.), affd., 546 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1976); Alaska Interstate Co. 
v. McMillan, 402 F. Supp. 532, 540 (D. Del. 1975); Spielman v. General Host Corp., 402 F. 
Supp. 190, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd., 538 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); Commonwealth Oil Refining 
Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267, 273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Broder v. Dane, 384 
F. Supp. 1312, 1319 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. 
Supp. 1344, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
Several years after the decision in Electronic Specialty, Judge Friendly was still troubled by 
the use of litigation in takeover contests: 
This appeal illustrates the growing practice of companies that have become the target of 
tender offers to seek shelter under § 7 of the Clayton Act .... Drawing Excalibur from a 
scabbard where it would doubtless have remained sheathed in the face of a friendly [tender] 
offer, the target company typically hopes to obtain a temporary injunction which may frus-
trate the acquisition since the offering company may well decline the expensive gambit of a 
trial or, if it persists, the long lapse of time could so change conditions that the offer will fail 
even if, after a full trial and appeal, it should be determined that no antitrust violation has 
been shown. 
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
883 (1974). In the same case he also observed, with respect to the Williams Act claim that target 
management had asserted, that "[t]arget companies must not be provided the opportunity to use 
[disclosure provisions] as a tool for dilatory litigation." 498 F.2d at 872. 
29. In addition to the cases cited in note 28 supra, see, for example, Hanson Trust PLC v. 
SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 60 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Although we should not hesitate to enforce the 
[Williams] Act's disclosure provisions through appropriate relief, we must also guard against 
improvident or precipitous use of remedies that may have the effect of favoring one side or the 
other in a takeover battle when allegations of violation of the Act, often made in the heat of the 
contest, may not be substantiated. In this context the preliminary injunction, which is one of the 
most drastic tools in the arsenal of judicial remedies, must be used with great care, lest the forces 
of the free market place, which in the end should determine the merits of takeover disputes, are 
nullified.") (citation omitted); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 269 (2d Cir. 
1984) ("Developments in corporate control contests often proceed swiftly, and timing may have 
a crucial impact on the outcome. . . . [T]he courts themselves are too often drawn into the 
fray. . . . [I]t is not for us to make the policy choices that will determine whether this style of 
corporate warfare will escalate or diminish."); Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Intl., 741 F.2d 707, 715 
(5th Cir. 1984) (refusing to grant target preliminary injunction in part because of reluctance "to 
provide a weapon for management to discourage takeover bids or prevent large accumulations of 
stock which would create the potential for such attempts") (quoting Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper 
Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975)); Liberty Natl. Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 566 
(11th Cir. 1984) ("To permit the [target to sue the bidder] simply because [the bidder] made a 
false filing would tip the balance towards [target] management, thereby injuring the existing 
investors. . . . The threat of this sort of litigation might remove from the field a player whose self-
interest is to monitor management, and who is poised to mount a proxy fight or a tender offer."); 
Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 249 (8th Cir. 1979) ("The disclosure 
requirements established by Congress are not intended to provide a weapon for current manage-
ment to discourage bids or prevent large accumulations of stock."); Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone 
& Sons, Inc., 488 F.2d 207, 209-10 (2d Cir. 1973) ("A familiar defensive tactic increasingly used 
by target companies to delay or thwart a take-over bid ... has been the institution of a lawsuit 
against the offerer charging violations of the federal antitrust laws or non-disclosure of material 
information in violation of the Williams Act.") (citation omitted); Butler Aviation Intl. v. Com-
prehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842, 845 (2d Cir. 1970) ("While courts should rigorously 
enforce the policy of honesty and fair dealing prescribed by federal securities legislation, they 
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Of course, it is tempting to conclude in light of this increasingly 
must guard against the risk that, at the instance of incumbent management, they may be frustrat-
ing informed shareholders from doing what the latter want."); Seilon, Inc. v. Lamb, [1983-1984 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) U 99,448, at 96,549-51 (N.D. Ohio 1983) 
("[E]xtending standing to the [target] brings with it grave risks to the shareholders and their 
interests. By allowing management to sue in the corporation's name, some delay in the ultimate 
resolution of the dispute between incumbents and challengers will always occur. • • • [D]elny 
favors embattled management. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, management can use 
the corporation's assets as its armory against the takeover campaign. In many, if not most in-
stances, this opportunity will be exploited for the benefit of management, and to the detriment of 
the shareholder's equity and investment. . • . Any attempt to expand [Williams Act] litigation 
must be strenuously resisted, else the judiciary find itself unwittingly furthering the destruction of 
vital shareholder interests."); Equity Oil Co. v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, 596 F. Supp. 507, 511, 
514 (D. Utah 1983) ("A private cause of action [under section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934] for injunctive relief in the hands of [target] management would tip the balance in its 
favor, providing a powerful weapon for delay and perhaps defeat of a takeover attempt. • • • The 
[Williams Act] was designed to maintain neutrality in takeover attempts [and therefore] does not 
support [such] an implied right of action. . . . As soon as a Schedule 13D is filed, entrenched 
management can use a suit for an injunction, with voluminous discovery requests, for its delay 
value to defeat any takeover attempt, regardless of the merits of the case.") (footnote omitted, 
emphasis added); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 
("[L]itigation can be misused by management for self-perpetuation in a manner which is contrary 
to the interest and welfare of their stockholders."); Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Belzberg, 522 F. 
Supp. 35, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("The question arises as to whether the mere assertion that a 
defendant's actual undisclosed intent is to acquire control is sufficient to state a claim, mindful of 
the Supreme Court's admonition that Section 13(d) was not designed to provide a weapon for 
management to prevent large accumulations of stock, and of the potential for abusive and harass-
ing litigation that might be instigated against every investor that acquires sufficient shares and 
files a Schedule 13D.") (citation omitted); Standard Metals Corp. v. Tomlin, 503 F. Supp. 586, 
603 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("To grant a preliminary injunction under [these] circumstances would 
unfairly provide [target] management with a weapon to discourage take-over bids, contrary to 
the purpose of Section 13(d)."); Gateway Indus. v. Agency Rent A Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92, 
101 (N.D. III. 1980) ("[P]ermitting [target] corporations to maintain [section 13(d)] actions well 
might give them a competitive advantage vis-a-vis takeover groups and thereby destroy the neu-
trality the Williams Act sought to achieve."); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 490 F. Supp. 660, 
664, 666 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The [Williams Act] was not in-
tended to be used as a device by which incumbent management defends itself against a takeover 
bid. . . . [T]he Court does not believe that [target management] is the most appropriate party to 
maintain this suit in view of its interest (be it paramount or not) in retaining corporate control, 
an interest that does not necessarily coincide with the interests of the shareholders."); Chromal-
loy Arn. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 116, 119 (E.D. Mo. 1980) ("Plaintiff's allega-
tions concerning environmental disclosure, with the attendant extensive discovery, seem little 
more than a dilatory tactic."); S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1128 (D. 
Mass. 1978) ("[T]arget companies must not be provided the opportunity to use the [Williams Act 
disclosure provisions] as a tool for dilatory litigation.") (quoting Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. 
Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1086 (5th Cir. 1970)); Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies 
Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960, 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (quoting Butler Aviation Intl., Inc. v. Comprehen-
sive Designers, Inc.; 425 F.2d 842, 845 (2d Cir. 1970), quoted supra); Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman, 
397 F. Supp. 221, 225, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Federal courts .•• have become a common arena 
in which tender offer battles are waged .... Target companies must not be provided the opportu-
nity to use [Williams Act disclosure provisions] as a tool for dilatory litigation."); Texasgulf, Inc. 
v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 430-31 (S.D. Tex. 1973) ("We have delayed too long. 
The temporary restraining order should have been dissolved weeks ago. Texasgulf has bought 
itself more time than was needed. It is now time for the shareholders to decide in the democratic 
marketplace if they want to tender their shares ... and for those who have already tendered them 
to decide if, in light of this opinion, they wish to withdraw their tenders."); Nicholson File Co. v. 
H.K. Porter Co., 341 F. Supp. 508, 520 (D.R.I. 1972) ("The intent of§ 13(d) was to protect 
shareholders, not to give management a tool to fight off unwelcome tender offers."), ajfd., 482 
F.2d 421 (!st Cir. 1973); see also San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust of 
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common judicial attitude that the courts can (and do) view target law-
suits with appropriate suspicion and that further regulation of this de-
fensive response is unnecessary. Proponents of this view would cite 
judicial disapprovals of target litigation not as evidence of a problem 
in need of a solution, 30 but rather as proof that the courts themselves 
are effectively checking attempts to use litigation improperly as a 
weapon in control contests.31 To put this somewhat differently, since 
a grant of relief presupposes that the plaintiff's claim has merit, a deci-
sion that relief is warranted (and, conversely, the courts' willingness to 
deny relief where it is not)32 obviates the danger that target managers 
may be using litigation inappropriately to entrench themselves in 
office. 
This argument, however, confuses the meritoriousness of a legal 
claim with the propriety of permitting its assertion by target manag-
ers;33 even if such a claim is, in one sense, properly brought, it may not 
be proper for target management to bring it. Moreover, even unsuc-
cessful litigation may hamper a value-increasing takeover or impose 
otherwise avoidable costs on takeover contestants and society. Target 
litigation, in short, poses dangers that arise principally from the con-
flict of interest that potentially afflicts target managers in a control 
contest. In Part II, I discuss those dangers and suggest that, absent 
other safeguards, they are not adequately mitigated by a judicial deter-
mination of meritoriousness. 
II. TARGET MANAGEMENT'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND THE 
DANGERS OF TARGET LITIGATION 
Managers may oppose takeover attempts for many reasons, includ-
ing a good faith belief that such opposition can result in a better deal 
for their shareholders.34 It would be unfair and inaccurate to con-
clude that managers oppose tender offers only to retain their control 
Am., 701 F.2d 1000, 1002-03 (1st Cir. 1983); Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 283-84, 
286-87 (4th Cir. 1983). 
30. Cf notes 24-29 supra and accompanying text. 
31. See, e.g., 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 298 (arguing that "[a]t this time, courts ap-
pear generally unsympathetic - they are skeptical about target claims and reluctant to obstruct 
premium offers and free market dynamics") (footnotes omitted); Hertzberg, Takeover Targets 
Find Loading Up on Debt Can Fend Off Raiders, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (Midwest 
ed.) (arguing that "[t]he period of the litigation defense is gone" (quoting Martin Lipton) and 
that "[t]he courts will intervene on occasion, but there's much more sparing use of their power" 
(quoting Arthur Fleischer, Jr.)). 
32. See notes 28 & 29 supra. 
33. Moreover, it implies, perhaps incorrectly, see note 43 infra, that a grant of preliminary 
relief confirms a claim's merit. 
34. See notes 77-85 infra and accompanying text. 
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over a target's assets. On the other hand, target managers can suffer 
serious losses in takeovers; relinquishing control can involve an obvi-
ous loss of wealth and stature, often through forfeiture of firm-specific 
human capital. 35 Ignoring the self-interested incentives of managers 
to fight control bids would therefore be unrealistic. 
In view of target management's potential conflict of interest, target 
lawsuits pose two distinctive risks. First, litigation has a special tacti-
cal value for target managers concerned with protecting their own po-
sitions. As a result, when faced with a hostile tender offer, conflicted 
target managers may be tempted, to an unusual degree, to manufac-
ture a legal claim where there is in fact no injury. Second, litigation 
frequently confounds hostile bidders and helps preserve the indepen-
dence of the target firm. Empirical studies demonstrate that this result 
often harms target shareholders and perhaps the economy generally by 
impeding the flow of corporate resources to their highest-valued uses. 
I discuss these points separately in this Part, concluding that target 
litigation should be subjected to rules designed to temper target man-
agement's conflict of interest. Such rules, I suggest in Part III, would 
preserve the ability of target managers to pursue bona fide legal claims 
while diminishing the risks that currently inhere in target litigation. 
A. The Tactical Value of Target Litigation and the Risk of 
Frivolous Claims 
A variety of tactical considerations can lead target managers to file 
lawsuits against hostile bidders with little regard for the underlying 
merits of such suits. Occasionally, for example, managers hope that a 
lawsuit will actually result in a permanent or temporary injunction 
against the bid and thus defeat an unwanted takeover attempt.36 
35. See, e.g., Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 
11 J. FIN. EcoN. 5, 31 (1983). In other words, managers may have training and skills that are 
peculiarly suited to the target firm. If these managers lose their jobs, they may therefore be 
unable to secure new positions at the same levels of prestige and compensation. See also Easter-
brook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 1197-98 (discussing target management's conflict of interest). 
Similarly, as John Coffee notes in a slightly different context, "[m]anagers are inherently over-
invested in the firm they serve .... [T]he manager ... is [thus] economically wedded to his firm." 
Coffee, supra note 23, at 17, 19. Coffee's thesis - that asymmetric attitudes toward risk produce 
"a deep internal strain" between shareholders and managers, id. at 13, suggests a more pervasive 
conflict of interest than the one on which I focus. Thus, Coffee's argument implies that manage-
ment's greater aversion to risk affects all management decisions, including the decision whether 
(and how) to oppose a takeover bid. See id. at 16-24, 60·67. Coffee proposes a "policy of pre-
mium sharing," id. at 9, 14, that would produce a more equitable division of takeover gains 
between target shareholders and their managers. Arguably, such a policy would abate target 
management's conflict of interest and thus reduce its urge to resist takeover attempts. I discuss 
Coffee's proposal below. See notes 187-92 infra and accompanying text. 
36. See generally 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 257-64; 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, 
supra note 8, at § 6.09[1]; E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 8, at 266; S. LORNE, supra 
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Thus, target managers sometimes sue bidders under section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, 37 claiming that the proposed takeover would substan-
tially lessen competition.38 Similarly, targets may bring injunctive ac-
tions asserting violations of other substantive legal requirements, such 
as federal margin regulations39 or special provisions restricting control 
changes.40 In these cases, the plaintiffs hope that the lawsuit will be a 
note 8, at§ 4.05[3][6][i]; Chemo & Sussman, Tender-Offer Litigation, LITIGATION, Winter 1984, 
at 41, 44. 
37. 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1982). 
38. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 982 (1982); Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1981); Buffalo 
Forge Co. v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 638 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1981); Hamischfeger Corp. v. 
Paccar, Inc., 624 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir.) (decision without published opinion), ajfg. 474 F. Supp. 
1151 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 546 F.2d 25 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), 
ajfg. 423 F. Supp. 199 (D. Md. 1976); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 
851, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974). 
Target managers sometimes assert claims under other antitrust provisions, such as section 8 
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1982) (barring interlocking directorates), see, e.g., Crouse-
Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 416, 448 n.12 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), or section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (barring agreements in restraint of trade), see, e.g., Emhart 
Corp. v. USM Corp., 527 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1975), but Clayton Act section 7 claims are far more 
common. 
For a discussion of target managers' standing to assert antitrust claims, see Easterbrook & 
Fischel, supra note 15. 
39. See, e.g., Pabst Brewing Co. v. Jacobs, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ff 99,042 (D. Minn. 1982); Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Co., 423 F. Supp. 199 (D. Md.), 
ajfd. per curiam, 546 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1976). The federal margin regulations, adopted by the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System pursuant to section 7 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1982), limit the use of debt for the purchase of securities. 
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 207, 220, 221, 224 (1986) (respectively, Regulations G, T, U, and X). 
Those courts of appeals that have considered the issue have refused to recognize implied 
private rights of action for violations of the margin rules. See Bennett v. United States Trust Co., 
770 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 800 (1986); Bassler v. Central Natl. Bank, 
715 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1983); Walck v. American Stock Exch., 687 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983); Gilman v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 660 F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1981); 
Gutter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 603 F.2d 1073 
(4th Cir. 1979); Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Steams & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 890 (1977). Moreover, in 1982 the Board of Governors adopted amendments to the 
margin rules that lessened their impact on corporate takeovers. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.7(a)(l), 
221.1, 207.2(1) (1986); 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 304-05. Accordingly, although targets 
still sometimes assert disclosure violations based on the failure to reveal margin violations, see, 
e.g., Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199 (D. Md.), ajfd. per curiam, 546 F.2d 25 
(4th Cir. 1976); Pabst Brewing Co. v. Jacobs, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ff 99,042 (D. Minn. 1982); Pabst Brewing Co. v. Kalmanovitz, [1982 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ff 98,873 (D. Del. 1982); Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. 
Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975), margin claims have become less useful to target managers. 
40. Some states, for example, bar transfers of control involving state banks or insurance com-
panies without prior approval by state authorities. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 11706 (Deering 
1978); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 382.040 (Supp. 1986); N.Y. BANKING LAW§ 142 (McKinney 1971 & 
Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT.§ 722.072 (1985). Similarly, in certain regulated industries federal 
provisions require administrative agency approval of control changes. These types of provisions 
apply, for instance, to banks and bank holding companies, see Bank Holding Company Act § 3, 
12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817(j), 1828(c); County Natl. Bancorporation v. Board of 
Governors, 654 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1981); Marshall & Ilsley Corp. v. Heimann, 652 F.2d 685 
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 981 (1982), airlines, see Federal Aviation Act § 408, 49 
U.S.C. § 1378 (1982), broadcasting companies, see Federal Communications Act§§ 221, 310, 47 
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"show-stopper" - a case in which the court finds sufficient evidence 
of illegality to warrant at least a preliminary injunction against the 
offeror. Issuance of even a preliminary injunction often effectively 
kills a hostile tender offer, for it postpones indefinitely the bidder's 
execution of the offer;41 only the rarest of bidders would keep an offer 
open under such circumstances, even if it were willing to incur the 
considerable expense of a trial. 42 
Of course, in order to convince the court to issue a preliminary 
injunction, target management must go a long way toward proving 
illegal conduct by the bidder. Thus, although the standard may vary 
from one court to another, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction 
generally must establish (1) a likelihood of success on the merits and 
(2) the inadequacy of a damage remedy for the alleged wrong (i.e., that 
plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted).43 
U.S.C. §§ 221, 310 (1982); United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S, 334 (1959); Gen-
eral Host Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), interstate rail-
roads and motor carriers, see Interstate Commerce Act§§ 5, 6, 1, 11, 14, 24 Stat. 379, 380-83 
(1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 11341, 11343-51 (1982)); United States v. ICC, 396 U.S. 
491 (1970); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. ICC, 736 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 1208 (1985); Water Transp. Assn. v. ICC, 715 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 
U.S. 1006 (1984), and federal savings and loan associations, see 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730(q), 1730a(e) 
(1982); Kaneb Servs. v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 650 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1981); Fidelity 
Fin. Corp. v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 359 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Cal. 1973). 
41. This is not true, however, where the grant of preliminary injunctive relief is based on 
illegal conduct that is readily curable, such as violations of certain disclosure requirements. See, 
e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Candee Corp. v. Farley, 573 F. 
Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Saunders Leasing Sys. v. Societe Holding Gray D'Albion S.A., 507 
F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., 495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. 
Mich. 1980). In such cases, the bidder can often remedy the disclosure problem and proceed 
with the offer without much (if any) delay beyond the time periods prescribed by the federal 
tender offer rules. See, e.g., Pacific Realty Trust v. APC Invs., Inc., 685 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 
1982); Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979). But see Spin-
ner Corp. v. Princeville Dev. Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 
93,058 (D. Haw. 1986) (granting preliminary injunction due to inadequacy of corrective disclo-
sure); MacFadden Holdings, Inc. v. JB Acquisition Corp. [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. 11 92,856, at 94,168·69 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding corrective disclosure and withdrawal inade-
quate in case of "deliberate" and "blatant" misrepresentations), revd., [1986-1987 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.1] 92,939 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding tender offer materials not misleading), 
42. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974) (Friendly, J.). 
43. See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975); E.H.I. of Fla., Inc. v. 
Insurance Co. ofN. Am., 652 F.2d 310, 312-13 (3d Cir. 1981); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum 
Commn. v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 1980); Mason County 
Medical Assn. v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256, 261 (6th Cir. 1977); Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 
567, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1974); Bath Indus. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970). In addition, courts 
usually consider how their decision whether to grant or refuse a preliminary injunction will affect 
other interests, including the general public interest. See authorities cited supra, this footnote. 
Some have argued that this standard is too restrictive. Professor Hammond, for example, 
suggests that a lower threshold may be appropriate where, practically speaking, the failure to 
grant a preliminary injunction may render later judicial proceedings ineffectual. Hammond, /11-
ter/ocutory Injunctions: Time for a New Model?, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 240 (1980). A few courts, 
perhaps in response to this claim, have fashioned a more liberal standard. In the Second Circuit, 
for example, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show irreparable harm and either 
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Show-stoppers are therefore rare where target managers are acting 
purely tactically, with no regard for the merits of their legal claims. 
A more realistic goal of target litigation is to delay the tender offer 
beyond the usual minimum period of twenty business days. 44 Target 
managers may accomplish this goal by obtaining relief that has the 
effect of extending the offer. For example, a court may respond to 
alleged disclosure violations by ordering that the offer remain open for 
a certain period following full and complete disclosure by the bidder.45 
Alternatively, even where the target managers have little hope of ob-
taining a preliminary injunction against the bidder, they may be able 
to persuade the court to issue a temporary restraining order that effec-
tively delays execution of the bid.46 
Delay can significantly enhance management's efforts to resist a 
hostile bid. It affords managers more time to defeat the bid by imple-
menting a variety of defensive measures47 or, as a last resort, arranging 
(1) a likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to 
make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in plaintiff's 
favor. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206-
07 (2d Cir. 1979); Sonesta Intl. Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973); 
see also Dataphase Sys. v. CL Sys., 640 F.2d 109, 112-13 (8th Cir. 19&1); Chromalloy Am. Corp. 
v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 244 (8th Cir. 1979). But even this standard requires the 
movant, at the very least, to demonstrate fair ground for litigating the merits of its claim. 
In any case, the traditional test and its variants may be inapt for takeover litigation, where 
litigants arguably seek preliminary injunctions "to speed a decision and obtain a final resolution 
before events outrun the litigation process." 0. F1ss & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 367 (2d 
ed. 1984); see Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REv. 525, 557 
(1978) ("There can be a whole class of cases in which final hearings are unlikely . . . . Rather 
than try to predict how a fictional final hearing would apply a hypothetical final standard, courts 
should develop a standard for the single hearing that does occur."). Even a new standard, how-
ever, would leave the problem of tactically motivated target litigation unresolved if it failed to 
prevent the use oflawsuits to delay takeover bids. See notes 44-52 & 77-85 infra and accompany-
ing text. 
44. SEC Rule 14e-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l (1986). 
45. See, e.g., Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., 495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1980) 
(barring offerer from buying target's shares for 30 days following amendment of schedule 13D); 
see also Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 237 (D. Mass. 1982) (restraining 
filer of false schedule 13D from voting acquired shares pending remedial measures); Financial 
Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 96,403 
(D.D.C. 1978) (barring defendants who had improperly failed to file a schedule 13D from buying 
more shares or soliciting proxies until they made a ~escission offer to sellers). 
46. See, e.g., Scientific Computers, Inc. v. Edudata Corp., 599 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Minn.) 
(denying target's motion for preliminary injunction, following earlier grant of temporary re-
straining order, in view of finding that prior disclosure violations had been remedied), ajfd. in 
part and dismissed in part, 746 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1984). For discussions of the standards and 
procedures governing the issuance of temporary restraining orders, see 0. F1ss & D. RENDLE-
MAN, supra note 43, at 323-31; Nussbaum, Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary In-
junctions - The Federal Practice, 26 Sw. L.J. 265, 266-73 (1972). 
47. See note 75 infra and accompanying text. Discussions of takeover defensive measures are 
legion. See, e.g., P. DAVEY, DEFENSES AGAINST UNNEGOTIATED TENDER OFFERS (1977); Eas-
terbrook & Fischel, supra note 2; Gilson, supra note 2; Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Takeovers: 
Charter and By-Law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537 (1979); Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy 
of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979); Steinbrink, Manage-
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for a friendly merger with a "white knight."48 It also increases the 
risk and expense of the offer,49 which may cause the offeror to aban-
don its takeover attempt.50 Thus, while delay does not always help 
managers preserve their control of the target firm, 51 it is perceived as a 
useful strategy in control contests. 52 
While most tactically motivated target lawsuits are filed with the 
hope of blocking or at least delaying the unwanted offer, there are 
other strategic considerations that motivate target managers to sue. 
First, suing underscores management's determination to defeat the 
bid. This may be psychologically rewarding to target managers, since 
it affords a tangible means by which they can demonstrate to them-
selves and other target employees that they intend to wage a fierce 
battle against the hostile bid. 53 More important, litigation also signals 
management's determination to the bidder, to the market in which the 
target's shares are traded, and, more particularly, to risk arbi-
trageurs.54 Since target shareholders frequently try to avoid the risks 
ment's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 882 (1978); Note, Lock-Up 
Options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1068 (1983); Comment, Antitakeover 
Maneuvers: Developments in Defensive Tactics and Target Actions for Injunctive Relief, 35 Sw. 
L.J. 617 (1981). See generally 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 291-387; 1 M. LIPTON & E. 
STEINBERGER, supra note 8, at§§ 6.01-6.09; S. LORNE, supra note 8, at§ 4.05[3][b]. 
48. A "white knight" is a friendly party with which target management negotiates a merger. 
Obviously, a white knight merger is synonomous with successful resistance by target managers 
only if they are permitted to retain their positions in the successor or surviving firm. 
In addition to affording target management time to locate and strike a deal with a white 
knight, litigation confirms the seriousness of management's intention to thwart the hostile bid; 
this can be tactically valuable as a means of maintaining the interest of a potential white knight 
with which the target managers have already begun discussions. See 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 
8, at 300-01; Chemo & Sussman, supra note 36, at 44. 
49. See note 75 infra and accompanying text; see also notes 78-79 infra and accompanying 
text (discussing likelihood of a bidding contest as a result of litigation). 
50. See, e.g., notes 77-85 infra and accompanying text (discussing empirical study of defeated 
takeover bids). Note also that, to the extent that a bidder is induced to withdraw rather than face 
a bidding contest for control of the target, litigation further stimulates the interest of potential 
white knights that management already may have contacted. See note 58 infra. 
51. If the effect of delay is to provoke an auction for the target firm, the target usually loses 
its independence. See note 81 infra and accompanying text. Auctions, however, have a signifi-
cant positive effect on target shareholder wealth. See notes 83-84 infra and accompanying text. 
It is this that leads Gregg Jarrell to assert that target litigation should be viewed as an attempt by 
managers to maximize the wealth of their shareholders. See Jarrell, supra note 4. I argue against 
that hypothesis below. See notes 92-143 infra and accompanying text. 
52. See, e.g., E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 8, at 266; 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 
8, at 300; 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 8, at § 6.05[5][a]; s. LORNE, supra note 8, 
at§ 4.05[3][b][i]; Chemo & Sussman, supra note 36, at 44; Wachtell, supra note 12, at 1437; see 
also Jarrell, supra note 4, at 153; notes 77-82 infra and accompanying text. 
53. See, e.g., 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 8, at § 6.05[5][a]; Wach tell, supra 
note 12, at 1437-38. Occasionally, a vigorously asserted lawsuit may prove psychologically 
debilitating to the bidder, although that seems unlikely given that any reasonably sophisticated 
bidder will fully expect its offer to be met with litigation. See, e.g., S. LORNE, supra note 8, at 
§ 4.05[3][b][i]. 
54. For discussions of arbitrage activity in takeover contests, see E. ARANOW & H. EIN-
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of the tender offer process by selling their shares to arbitrageurs, ss the 
latter's actions often determine the outcome of control contests. Thus, 
it is in the interest of entrenched target management to convince arbi-
trageurs not to tender to a hostile bidder. Litigation can help accom-
plish that end by increasing the likelihood (or, perhaps more 
accurately, the arbitrageurs' perception of the likelihood) that the tar-
get managers will defeat or delay the offer or at least facilitate a bid-
ding contest. Arbitrageurs who anticipate any of these outcomes will 
hold rather than tender - either to avoid tying up their shares in a 
delayed or unsuccessful offer, or in the expectation of a higher subse-
quent bid. 56 
Another tactical value of litigation is that it allows for wide-rang-
ing discovery, which, in addition to being a source of expense and de-
lay, provides target managers with a wealth of information regarding 
the bidder and the tender offer.s7 Much of this information may be 
useful for resisting the takeover attempt, even if it is only marginally 
relevant to target management's lawsuit.s8 
HORN, supra note 8, at 173-91; 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 8, at § 1.07[2]; 
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1393 n.60; Henry, Activities of Arbitrageurs in Tender 
Offers, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 466 (1971); Rubin, Arbitrage, 32 Bus. LAW. 1315 (1977). 
55. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1393 n.60 (discussing why target sharehold-
ers find it in their interest to sell to arbitrageurs and offering empirical evidence supporting this 
point). 
56. On the latter possibility, see Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1392-93 & n.60. A 
related goal of litigation may be to dissuade arbitrageurs from taking positions in the target's 
stock in the first place. As Herbert Wachtell has noted, 
one of the consequences oflawsuits in takeover situations is to chill the arbitrage .... [I]f the 
arbitrageurs go into the market and buy heavily in the stock, they in essence are going to be 
the owners of that company. They have a very short-term interest in their investment which 
means a 99 percent chance that that company is going to get owned by someone in the end 
- be it the original bidder or someone else - but it is not in all likelihood going to remain 
independent. 
So, one might be very interested, if one is representing the target company, in chilling the 
arbitrage, and chilling it fast, which means that a complaint has to get out very quickly .... 
[If] the arbitrageurs' counsel . . . say to the arbitrageurs, "I would be careful on this 
one .... "that heavy arbitrage buying may well not develop. 
Wachtell, supra note 12, at 1437 (emphasis in original); see also 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 
300; 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 8, § 6.05(5), at 6-61 to 6-62; Chemo & Suss-
man, supra note 36, at 44. To put this somewhat differently, management will have a better 
chance of defeating a bid if it can keep target stock from becoming concentrated in the hands of 
arbitrageurs, who, because of their sophistication and investment goals, are more likely to tender 
than "ordinary" target shareholders. 
Note that, in a more general sense, litigation may be one way to generate publicity about the 
target's opposition to the bid, which could affect shareholder decisions whether to tender. See, 
e.g., S. LORNE, supra note 8, § [3][b][i], at 4-99. 
57. See, e.g., Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 116, 119 (E.D. Mo. 
1980); S. LORNE, supra note 8, § 4.05[3][b][i]; Arthur, Kirby & Rein, supra note 14, at 10. 
58. Some of this information may also be useful for attracting a potential white knight. See 
note 48 supra and accompanying text. For example, discovery can reveal the bidder's plans for 
value-increasing redeployment of the target's assets - information which may inspire the inter-
est of another suitor. Cf Gilson, supra note 2, at 865-67 (arguing that target managers should be 
permitted to engage in defensive tactics that reveal information to potential competing bidders). 
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Finally, target managers can offer to settle existing litigation as a 
concession in negotiations with the bidder for more favorable merger 
terms. Admittedly, this tactical use of litigation hardly aids in re-
sisting an ultimate takeover, 59 but it does suggest yet another reason 
why management may sue for largely strategic purposes.60 
In sum, resistant, self-interested target managers have powerful 
tactical incentives to sue hostile bidders, whether or not their action 
represents good-faith pursuit of a genuine legal claim. As a conse-
quence, the risk that such managers will assert frivolous claims against 
bidders seems peculiarly great, especially when one recalls the appar-
ent eagerness of some advisers to urge the commencement of litigation 
as an "automatic" response to an unwanted bid. 61 If so, heightened 
concern regarding the meritoriousness of target suits clearly seems 
appropriate. 
More important, the likelihood that a target lawsuit will be 
brought for tactical reasons without a sound legal basis suggests that 
in this context it may be unwise to rely solely on a court's ability to 
ferret out and dismiss meritless claims. 62 Currently, target managers 
sue first and ask questions later; there is little reason for them to tem-
per their urge to exploit the tactical value of litigation against the bid-
der, since at worst they face dismissal of their claims for lack of merit. 
The resulting cost is real and substantial: courts and lawyers must 
devote a good deal of their time and resources to lawsuits that are 
ultimately determined to be frivolous. 63 Accordingly, even if one is 
satisfied that courts are sufficiently vigilant and sophisticated to make 
59. Conceivably, however, managers intent on pursuit of their own interests could offer to 
terminate litigation in exchange for side payments (such as retention of their positions with the 
target) from the offeror. See Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment ill Cor-
porate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1743 (1985). For self-interested target managers, 
therefore, the use of litigation as a "bargaining chip," see 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 301; 
Cherno & Sussman, supra note 36, at 44, may be tactically valuable as a means of resisting at 
least some of the consequences (such as the ouster of incumbent management) of a successful 
takeover. See note 35 supra and accompanying text (discussing target management's conflict of 
interest in takeover situations). 
60. See 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 301; Cherno & Sussman, supra note 36, at 44. Of 
course, this is unlikely to be a useful strategy unless target management's claims are nonfrivo-
lous, which is often not the case with target litigation. Moreover, if the asserted cause of action 
does have real merit, that may complicate the target's ability to bargain with the bidder; legiti· 
mate claims may prompt government interest or otherwise present obstacles to a takeover (e.g., 
real concerns regarding substantive legal requirements, see notes 36-40 supra and accompanying 
text) that will not disappear simply because the target managers drop their lawsuit. Sophisti· 
cated managers, recognizing this, often find that the optimal strategy is to threaten litigation. 
See, e.g., 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 265 n.98. 
61. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text. 
62. See notes 24-29 & 36-60 supra and accompanying text. 
63. See notes 13, 16, 28 & 29 supra; see also notes 144-54 infra and accompanying text (dis-
cussing other costs of target lawsuits). 
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the right determinations most of the time, 64 preserving target manage-
ment's incentive to file frivolous suits seems wasteful and unwar-
ranted. It is partly for this reason that I propose, in Part III, reforms 
that would recognize and temper management's conflict of interest in 
suits against bidders. 
B. The Effectiveness of Target Litigation in Defeating Hostile Bids: 
The Costs and Benefits 
1. Does Litigation Help Target Managers Resist Unwanted Bids? 
Given that entrenched target managers are moved by a variety of 
tactical considerations to sue bidders, there remains the question 
whether litigation actually helps managers resist hostile takeover bids. 
For a variety of reasons, I conclude that it does. 
First, whatever the specific reason for using a lawsuit tactically in a 
control contest, 65 one thing seems clear: the principal goal of litigious 
target managers is to maintain their company's independence and, de-
rivatively, their own place in the corporate structure. 66 Although liti-
gation, like other defensive measures, 67 often precedes a higher offer 
by the original or a subsequent bidder, 68 target managers sue bidders 
primarily to thwart takeover attempts. 69 One simple measure of the 
effectiveness of litigation as an anti-takeover device, therefore, is the 
frequency with which litigious target managers succeed in maintaining 
their control over the target. 
Empirical studies suggest a significant success rate for litigating 
target managements. For example, in his study of one hundred litig-
ious target defenses, Jarrell found that the target remained indepen-
dent in twenty-one cases.70 More strikingly, empirical evidence that I 
gathered for this Article suggests. that litigation is the single most ef-
64. See notes 13 & 31 supra {describing the view of some commentators that courts are in-
creasingly skeptical regarding target lawsuits); see also notes 24-29 supra and accompanying text. 
65. For a discussion of the various strategic considerations that lead target managers to sue 
hostile bidders, see notes 36-60 supra and accompanying text. 
66. As noted, Gregg Jarrell apparently disagrees. See Jarrell, supra note 4, at 152-53, 154-59; 
text accompanying note 9 supra. I discuss Jarrell's thesis at notes 92-143 infra and accompanying 
text. 
67. See Gilson, supra note 2, at 868. See generally Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1038-41 {dis-
cussing effect of auctioneering rule on takeover premiums). 
68. See Jarrell, supra note 4, at 161-71. Jarrell argues that litigation is a significant cause of 
bidding contests for targets. As I discuss below, however, his data show only that delay of a first 
offer increases the likelihood of an auction; he does not closely analyze the relationship between 
litigation and delay. See notes 113-14 infra and accompanying text. I argue below that even if 
delay is desirable as a means of spurring an auction for the target, it may be achieved more 
cheaply and effectively than through litigation. See notes 115-25 infra and accompanying text. 
69. See Part I supra. 
70. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 153. Jarrell concedes that these cases are "difficult to square" 
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fective defense used by targets that successfully preserve their 
independence. 
I examined a sample of fifty-three defeated hostile tender offers be-
tween 1973 and 1985 in which the target remained independent for at 
least one year.71 From stories on each tender offer in the Wall Street 
Journal, 72 I determined that target managers employed defensive 
measures in forty-five cases, 73 thirty-nine of which included litigation 
with his hypothesis that "the goal of target management is to increase the takeover price and not 
to drive away all bids." Id. at 152-53; see notes 100-11 infra and accompanying text. 
Unfortunately, Jarrell does not examine the precise role of litigation in these twenty-one 
cases. Thus, his study does not reveal whether a target in a particular case owes its independence 
to management's lawsuit or to the effectiveness of other defensive measures. See note 20 supra. I 
attempt to address this distinction in my own study. See notes 72-76 infra and accompanying 
text. 
71. The sample was originally compiled and later updated by Kidder, Peabody & Co. (Kid-
der) as part of a study it conducted to determine the wealth effects of successful takeover de-
fenses. See Kidder, Peabody & Co., Summary of Defeated Hostile Tender Offers 1973-1985 (July 
26, 1985). The original Kidder study was considered by the SEC's Advisory Committee on 
Tender Offers and has been critically analyzed by Frank Easterbrook and Gregg Jarrell. See 
Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain From Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277, 
287-91 (1984). 
I relied on the Kidder sample for two reasons. First, although commentators may disagree 
sharply regarding the implications of the Kidder study, compare Lipton II, supra note 1, at 1026 
(arguing that the defeat of a hostile takeover attempt can lead to a wealth increase for target 
shareholders), with Easterbrook & Jarrell, supra (arguing that the Kidder study, properly ana-
lyzed, does not support Lipton's contention), and Dutt, SEC Economist Slams Kidder's Widely-
Used Takeover Analysis, CORP. FIN. WEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at 1, 9 (same), and Pound, Takeover 
Defeats Hurt Stockholders: A Reply to the Kidder Peabody Study, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J, 33 
(1986) (same), the sample is reliable for my purposes, if one accepts the study's criterion for 
defeat of a hostile bid (le., remaining independent for at least one year). But see Pound, supra, at 
37 (arguing that a target's ultimate acquisition after a one-year period is inconsistent with a 
"successful" defense); Bradley, Desai & Kim, The Rationale Behind Intelfirm Tender Offers: 
Information or Synergy?, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 183 (1983) (five-year horizon chosen to distinguish 
between successful and unsuccessful acquisition attempts). Moreover, even defining "defeat" 
more rigorously, to require target independence for at least two years, would exclude from the 
sample only seven contests, in five of which litigation did not figure significantly in target man-
agement's defense. 
Second, because the Kidder sample consists almost entirely of takeover contests that were 
widely followed in the press, it was relatively easy to gather information regarding the defensive 
measures that were employed in all but a few contests in the sample. See note 72 infra (describ-
ing exclusion of three contests from my study). Copies of both the Kidder study and my study 
are on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
72. The Kidder sample included 56 control contests. I excluded from my study three con-
tests for which either no or very little information was available in the Wall Street Joumal. 
73. In the remaining eight cases, the bid was either withdrawn when the bidder learned of 
target management's opposition, or it expired without having attracted the requisite number of 
tenders. Since target managers in these cases generally opposed the bid on the ground that the 
price was inadequate, cases in the latter category imply that shareholders sometimes believe man-
agement's claim that the tender offer price is too low and therefore refuse to tender. For exam-
ple, in some (but not most) cases, the bid may reveal previously unknown information that causes 
target shareholders to value their stock more highly. See Bradley, Desai & Kim, supra note 71, 
at 204-06; Jensen & Ruback, supra note 35, at 15-16; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 
1389 n.51 (rejecting "information hypothesis" as satisfactory explanation for most tender offer 
activity). 
These eight cases (whatever their explanation) suggest that vigorous management opposition 
is not always necessary to defeat a takeover attempt. Obviously, this observation is potentially 
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against the bidder. 74 In twenty-two of these thirty-nine cases, the bid-
der's defeat was the result, directly or indirectly, of relief granted by 
the court.75 No other defensive measure accounted for as many as ten 
of the forty-five cases of successful target defense. 
It therefore appears that litigation helps target managers fend off 
hostile bids in a significant number of cases. 76 But what about those 
cases in which the target does not remain independent? Is there some 
sense in which litigation can be said to be an "effective" defensive mea-
sure in those cases? 
In one sense, litigation is a potent anti-takeover device even in con-
tests that culminate in a change of control. I have already discussed 
how litigation might be used to delay an unwanted tender offer. 77 De-
lay, it turns out, correlates highly with multiple-bid contests (or auc-
tions) for targets. 78 In other words, the longer a tender offer is 
delayed, the more likely it is that additional, higher bids for the target 
will emerge. It follows that target managers may use litigation, in ef-
fect, to stimulate competitive bidding for the target's shares.79 
quite significant to the ongoing debate regarding takeover defensive tactics. See, e.g., authorities 
cited at notes 1 & 2 supra. · 
74. This evidence is at least consistent with my claim that litigation is part of most target 
defenses. See notes 12-23 supra and accompanying text. Of course, since my study is based on a 
sample of successful defenses, it provides no direct evidence on the frequency of target litigation 
in control contests generally. 
75. In 10 cases, the court granted injunctive relief that effectively defeated the takeover bid. 
In the remaining 12 cases, the court granted relief that delayed execution of the tender offer 
beyond the usual 20-day waiting period prescribed by SEC Rule 14e-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 
(1986). These delays appeared to contribute significantly to management's resistance, in most 
cases by providing managers the time they needed to mount their successful defense. In a few 
cases, the court-ordered delay evidently increased the risk of the offer sufficiently to convince the 
bidder to withdraw. See notes 41-42 & 47-50 supra and accompanying text. See also Empirical 
Research Project, Defensive Tactics to Hostile Tender Offers - An Examination of Their Legiti-
macy and Effectiveness, 11 J. CoRP. L. 651, 700-01 & n.440 (1986) (reporting that outcome of 
control contests favored 60% oflitigating targets but only 43% ofnonlitigating targets in sample 
studied). 
76. It would be interesting to know how often target defenses succeed in the absence of 
litigation; such data would provide a better sense of the particular role played by target lawsuits 
(as distinguished from management resistance in general) in defeating unwanted bids. See notes 
20 & 70 supra. Litigation is so common a defensive response, however, that it is difficult to 
collect a reasonable sample of successful nonlitigious defenses. See notes 17-20 supra and accom-
panying text. But see note 75 supra (describing recent empirical study). 
77. See notes 44-52 & 75 supra and accompanying text. 
78. See M. Bradley, A. Desai & E. Kim, Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their Divi-
sion Between Target and Acquiring Firms 3-4 (rev. ed. July 1986) (unpublished working paper); 
Jarrell, supra note 4, at 160-61, 171; see also Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: 
A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
1145, 1178 n.95 (1984); Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations 
of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371, 373, 388, 405 (1980). 
79. Indeed, as noted earlier, Gregg Jarrell hypothesizes that this explains most target litiga-
tion. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 152-53, 154-59. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. But see 
notes 95-114 infra and accompanying text. 
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Provoking an auction is an effective means of resisting an initial 
bid; initial bidders usually fail to win control of target firms in multi-
ple-bid contests.80 But it is also true that targets rarely remain in-
dependent once an auction ensues: existing empirical evidence suggests 
that there are few multiple-bid contests among those tender offers in 
which the target is not ultimately taken over.81 Thus, while litigation 
can help target managers retain control of their firm, 82 in many cases 
it may actually facilitate a change of control, albeit to a subsequent 
bidder at a price higher than the initial offer. In these cases, obviously, 
litigation is not ultimately helpful to entrenched target managers who 
wish to retain their positions. 
It is also worth noting that, not surprisingly, shareholders of ac-
quired firms fare significantly better in auctions than in single-bid 
takeovers. Gregg Jarrell, for example, concluded from his multi-
method investigation of the returns to shareholders from competing 
bids that "auctions are quite lucrative for targets."83 Other empirical 
studies support this observation. 84 
In view of this evidence, some might argue that target litigation is 
laudable. Indeed, the conclusion Jarrell draws from his study is that 
target litigation [is] a strategic weapon that benefits shareholders by de-
laying the execution of the offending offer. This delay increases the likeli-
hood that a higher offer will be made by the original bidder or others .... 
. . . [L]itigating targets are very frequently the beneficiaries of delayed 
auctions or improved bids by the original suitors. The high frequency of 
these auctions and the large benefits they produce for target shareholders 
dominate the forgone losses [sic] in the cases where litigation helps to 
prevent takeovers ... . 
This finding ... suggests that most target litigation should be viewed 
as a value-maximizing gamble undertaken by managers in the best inter-
ests of their shareholders. 85 
80. See, e.g., Ruback, Assessing Competition in the Market for Corporate Acquisitions, 11 J. 
FIN. EcoN. 141, 147 (1983) (reporting a 75% failure rate for first bidders where a subsequent bid 
is made); M. Bradley, A. Desai & E. Kim, supra note 78, at 31 (reporting a 67% failure rate for 
first bidders). 
81. For example, the sample of26 defeated tender offers examined by Bradley, Desai & Kim, 
supra note 71, includes no multiple-bid contests. See MERC Tender Offer Database (available 
from Managerial Economics Research Center, University of Rochester Graduate School of Busi-
ness Administration). My study of 53 defeated bids, see note 71 supra, includes 9 cases in which 
competing bidders appear to have been involved. 
82. See notes 70-76 supra and accompanying text. 
83. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 169. 
84. See, e.g., M. Bradley, A. Desai & E. Kim, supra note 78, at 21 ("[T]he rate of return to 
target stockholders [is] greater in multiple-bidder contests than in single-bidder cases."); 
Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1038; Gilson, supra note 2, at 868 n.176. 
85. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 152-53. 
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I believe, however, that Jarrell's conclusion is wrong. I suggest 
below that target litigation as a general matter is likely to be harmful 
to the interests of target shareholders. 86 At best, I will show, Jarrell 
presents an argument for delaying tender offers and thereby stimulat-
ing competitive auctions; it does not follow that litigation is the best 
way to obtain that delay. Even if delay-induced bidding contests are 
desirable, I argue that such delay can be accomplished more cheaply 
and directly by means other than target litigation. 87 
2. Is Litigation in the Best Interests of Target Shareholders? 
Certain observations regarding takeover activity seem beyond dis-
pute. First, shareholders of firms that are acquired in tender offers 
generally realize substantial gains. 88 Second, those gains are usually 
even greater if the acquisition follows an auction for the target. 89 
Third, certain forms of target management opposition to takeover bids 
commonly elicit an auction;90 notable among these, of course, is litiga-
tion that succeeds in delaying an initial bid.91 
As I have noted, Gregg Jarrell concludes on the basis of these ob-
servations that litigation is in the interests of target shareholders.92 
Some would respond that permitting target managers to stimulate auc-
tions is not, as a general matter, in the best interests of target share-
holders. 93 These commentators suggest that allowing managers to 
elicit a bidding contest may raise the price received by target share-
holders ex post, in a given transaction, but only by raising the expense 
anticipated by a potential bidder ex ante, thus reducing the number of 
expected wealth-increasing bids.94 Such commentators might con-
86. See notes 95-143 infra and accompanying text. 
87. See notes 115-25 infra and accompanying text. 
88. See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 35, at 10-16 (summarizing empirical studies). 
89. See notes 83-84 supra and accompanying text. 
90. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text. 
91. See authorities cited at note 52 supra. 
92. See note 85 supra and accompanying text; see also Jarrell & Poulsen, Shark Repellents 
and Poison Pills: Stockholder Protection - From the Good Guys or the Bad Guys?, 4 MIDLAND 
CORP. FIN. J. 39, 40 (1986) (arguing that target litigation benefits target shareholders). 
93. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 10, at 229-30, 249-51; Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions 
and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
94. Commentators disagree sharply on whether an auction market generally increases target 
shareholder wealth. Compare Schwartz, supra note 10, and Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 93 
(arguing that the likelihood of bidding contests reduces the probability of an initial offer being 
made, which redounds to the detriment of shareholders), with Bebchuk, supra note 10, and Gil-
son, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 
51 (1982) (arguing that the possibility of an auction does not significantly deter initial bids). See 
also Coffee, supra note 78, at 1175-83 (essentially agreeing with Bebchuk and Gilson, on the 
ground that the market believes the demand curve for corporate control is inelastic); Carney, 
Two-Tier Tender Offers and Shark Repellents, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 48, 51-52 (1986) (argu-
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elude, therefore, that Jarrell mistakenly overlooks the ex ante impact 
of target litigation. But one need not reach the auction question (how-
ever interesting and important it may be) in order to conclude that 
litigation is on balance harmful to target shareholders. 
Even if Jarrell is correct that opposition to a takeover bid some-
times increases the wealth of target shareholders, his argument ignores 
the implications of target management's serious conflict of interest95 
and slights even his own empirical evidence.96 He concedes that "re-
maining independent by thwarting [a] takeover attempt is never a ben-
eficial outcome for target shareholders,"97 and acknowledges that 
twenty-one percent of the litigious managements in his study (i.e., 
twenty-one of the 100 in his sample) maintained their control over the 
target and thereby deprived their shareholders of substantial gains.98 
Yet he concludes that litigation is a "value-maximizing gamble"99 that 
target managers undertake in their shareholders' best interests. 
Jarrell's characterization of target litigation derives from his claim 
that the large gains from litigation-induced auctions100 "dominate the 
forgone losses [sic] in the cases where litigation helps to prevent take-
overs."101 Consequently, his argument - that litigation is a value-
maximizing gamble - is substantially weakened unless one believes 
ing that Easterbrook and Fischel implicitly assume, incorrectly, that the supply curve for target 
shares is perfectly elastic); Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 
N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 153, 205-14 (1986) (arguing that auctioneering rule increases social welfare by 
increasing supply of potential targets that invest in synergistic strategies). My purpose here is 
not to argue this point. Rather, as noted in the text, I believe that Jarrell is wrong irrespective of 
how one resolves the debate regarding competitive bidding. 
95. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. 
96. Cf Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two M,odels, 96 
YALE L.J. 295, 296-97 (1986): 
A successful auction means that target managers will possibly lose their jobs and certainly 
their autonomy. In adopting tactics that would tend to produce an auction, management 
may be hoping to thwart the takeover altogether. On the assumption that target manage-
ment will act in a self-interested way, how should we distinguish tactics that will increase 
shareholder wealth from those that will not? 
97. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 152. Jarrell relies on empirical studies showing that the price of 
target shares generally falls to its pre-offer level following an unsuccessful bid. See id. at 163, 
171; Bradley, Desai & Kim, supra note 71, at 193-98; Easterbrook & Jarrell, supra note 71, at 
283-84; Asquith, Merger Bids, Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns, 1 I J. FIN. EcoN. 51 (1983); 
see also Pound, supra note 71 (rebutting suggestion of study by Kidder, Peabody & Co. that 
target shareholders benefit from defeat of hostile bids); Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 
1389 n.51 (reviewing empirical evidence that while tender offer announcement results in signifi-
cant increase in price of target shares regardless of offer's outcome, price increase is permanent 
revaluation only for targets ultimately taken over, with price increase for targets remaining in-
dependent dissipated over subsequent six months). 
98. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 153, 171; see also note 75 supra and accompanying text. 
99. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 153. 
100. See notes 52 & 85 supra and accompanying text. 
101. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 153. 
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that his twenty-one and my twenty-two102 cases in which litigious 
targets avoided takeovers were unfortunate accidents. If they were in-
escapable accidents, they may well represent the price that must be 
paid for a system that on average benefits shareholders because it is 
more likely to provoke an auction than to thwart a takeover. If, how-
ever, the avoidance of takeover is not accidental, then one is chal-
lenged to devise a system that would preserve the benefits of 
stimulating auctions without incurring the costs of thwarting premium 
takeovers. 
As I have suggested, it is almost certain that the avoidance of take-
over by litigious targets is not accidental, that, indeed, avoiding take-
over is management's clear goal in these cases. First, management's 
interest in retaining control is a powerful motive that must be recog-
nized.103 Second, the takeover defense literature suggests that if any 
outcome of vigorous management opposition is (from management's 
point of view) second best, it is provoking an auction that results in a 
successful subsequent bid. Specialists advise managers to use lawsuits 
in order to resist takeovers, even though they recognize that sometimes 
resistant target managers will eventually lose to a different bidder (or 
to a higher offer from the initial bidder).104 Third, in cases that are 
not settled, target managers almost always lose.105 As Jarrell recog-
nizes, this "leaves us unsure about how often target managers would 
use legal victory to thwart the takeover completely. Perhaps many 
target managers capitulate and negotiate a takeover only because the 
courts refuse to protect them." 106 
Most troubling for Jarrell's thesis is the significant number of cases 
in which litigious managers actually preserve their control of the tar-
get. Jarrell says that this evidence requires a '"qualification" of his 
hypothesis, to the effect that "[f]or many of these cases ... remaining 
independent was the overriding goal of the defense. . . . [A]t least 
some actual takeovers would also have been thwarted if the legal bat-
tles had been won by the target managers."107 But Jarrell's twenty-
one and my twenty-two cases contradict rather than merely qualify his 
suggestion that litigation is usually a management gamble undertaken 
in the interests of target shareholders. The fact is that managers for-
sake substantial premiums in a large number of cases in which auc-
102. See note 75 supra and accompanying text. 
103. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. 
104. See authorities cited at notes 8 & 12-16 supra. 
105. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 153. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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tions do not develop and were unlikely to have been intended. Only if 
one attributes to managers the good-faith belief that remaining in-
dependent is beneficial for target shareholders despite the substantial 
short-term gains that are thereby sacrificed108 - an attribution that 
over the run of cases appears plausible only if one ignores manage-
ment's self-interest in preserving control1°9 - is the proportion of 
cases in which litigation thwarts takeovers consistent with the "share-
holder welfare theory of litigious defense." 110 In short, even if litiga-
tion is associated with auctions that increase target shareholder 
returns, it is difficult to believe that in the usual case target managers 
litigate with the intention of provoking an auction. Managers sue bid-
ders hoping to defeat the bid;111 if their hopes are realized (as they 
often are), the deleterious wealth effects for target shareholders may be 
substantial. 
This alone suggests that litigation is too costly a means of stimulat-
ing auctions and is not, therefore, in the interests of target sharehold-
ers. But the case for target litigation seems even weaker when one 
examines more closely the relationship between litigation and auc-
tions. Jarrell argues that litigation stimulates auctions. But his data 
show only that target management opposition correlates with competi-
tive-bid contests. Thus, he assumes that opposition necessarily in-
cludes litigation and attributes the higher incidence of auctions in 
opposition cases to the lawsuits he imagines are part of every target 
defense. 112 
While I agree that litigation is quite often included in a resistant 
management's defensive arsenal, 113 it is impossible to know whether it 
is litigation, resistance generally, or something else that provokes auc-
tions. All that the data (including Jarrell's) allow us to say with any 
confidence is that delay is associated with a high frequency of competi-
108. While some managers profess to believe that their shareholders will fare better in the 
long run if takeover is avoided, the evidence (including Jarrell's own findings) is compellingly the 
other way. See authorities cited at note 97 supra. The one study that purports to be to the 
contrary has been effectively discredited. See Easterbrook & Jarrell, supra note 71, at 287-91 
(showing that study by Kidder, Peabody & Co. is in fact consistent with studies demonstrating 
that targets lose from defeating hostile bids, if one takes into account overall market movements); 
Dutt, supra note 71 (same); Pound, supra note 71 (same). 
109. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. 
110. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 152. 
ll 1. See authorities cited at notes 8 & 12-16 supra; see also notes 70-75 supra and accompa-
nying text (describing evidence of the effectiveness of litigation in helping target managers fight 
off unwanted takeover attempts). 
ll2. See Jarrell, supra note 4, at 160-61. Indeed, Jarrell's own conclusion is that "[t]arget 
litigation (or public opposition) and auction-style takeovers appear to be closely related phenom-
ena .... " Id. at 161 (emphasis added); see also note 20 supra. 
113. See notes 17-23 supra and accompanying text. 
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tive bid contests.114 Jarrell's findings suggest that delay may be caused 
by target litigation in particular or by target opposition in general. 
Since he does not attempt to separate the two, we cannot conclude 
from his data that litigation is essential to the delay that correlates 
with a greater incidence of auctions. Given the real possibility that 
litigation may adversely affect target shareholder wealth, one might 
wish to learn more about the precise role of litigation in stimulating 
auctions before embracing Jarrell's thesis. 
Moreover, even if we assume (not implausibly) that litigation plays 
a role in delaying tender offers and that delay is desirable because it 
facilitates bidding contests, it does not follow that target lawsuits offer 
a preferred method of securing such delay. I explain why in the next 
section. 
3. Is Target Litigation Desirable as a Means 
of Delaying Tender Offers? 
Litigation is very expensive. Indeed, takeover specialists often 
cite the cost of defending against lawsuits as a virtue of the litigation 
strategy. 115 One could undertake a careful study of the direct costs 
imposed by litigation on targets and bidders, but that hardly seems 
necessary. If delay is a virtue, it can be accomplished with a great deal 
less expense for both bidder and target. For example, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission could easily and directly delay takeover 
bids by amending Rule 14e-l 116 to extend the required minimum pe-
riod for tender offers beyond twenty days. 117 
Some might oppose such an amendment, however, on the ground 
that greater delay would not always benefit target shareholders. Thus, 
amending rule 14e-1 as suggested might increase the risk and expense 
of all tender offers, possibly reducing the incidence of value-increasing 
bids. 118 More specifically, extended delay might disadvantage target 
shareholders in certain cases - for example, by scuttling the one bid 
114. See authorities cited at note 78 supra. 
115. See authorities cited at notes 8 & 12-16 supra. I speak here of the direct expenses of 
litigation to the litigants: attorneys' fees, management time spent on discovery requests and in 
court, and the like, although proper reckoning should also include the judicial resources that 
must be devoted to target suits. See note 63 supra and accompanying text. Below I discuss some 
of the larger social costs of target litigation. See notes 144-54 infra and accompanying text. 
116. SEC Rule 14e-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l (1986). 
117. The SEC's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers recommended such a change. See 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, RE-
PORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS, Recommendation 17'(July 8, 1983) (recommending extension of 
the minimum offering period to 30 days). 
118. Cf. authorities cited at note 93 supra (arguing that permitting target managers to stimu-
late auctions is generally not in the best interests of target shareholders). 
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that has been made in circumstances in which additional bidders are 
unlikely to emerge. A possible virtue of litigation as a source of delay 
is that managers can refrain from suing if that seems desirable. Litiga-
tion, in other words, affords target managers the ability to trigger de-
lay or not, as they deem appropriate. 
Like Jarrell's thesis, however, this argument ignores the implica-
tions of target management's conflict of interest119 and the empirical 
evidence of litigation's potency as an anti-takeover strategy. 120 Target 
litigation is in some sense like a game of Russian roulette; a lawsuit 
may simply delay an initial bid and provoke an auction, but given the 
motives of litigious target managers121 and the role that litigation can 
play in defeating hostile bids, the risk that the lawsuit will instead de-
prive target shareholders of a large premium (and possibly block a 
value-increasing redeployment of the target's assets)122 is quite high. 
This risk could be substantially reduced without forgoing the 
perceived benefits of management-triggered delay by adopting a rule 
that would give target managers discretion to delay the consummation 
of a tender offer for some specified period, simply upon request. Rule 
14e-1 might be amended in a slightly different manner, for example, to 
permit target managers to extend the minimum tender offer period on 
a showing that such a delay might help them secure a higher bid for 
the target. 123 By comparison, a lawsuit against the bidder seems very 
costly, for it not only involves substantial direct expense, but also car-
ries with it the distinct possibility that a tender offer in the sharehold-
ers' interests will be thwarted and that no competitive auction will 
emerge. 124 Thus, if a principal justification for target litigation is its 
(assumed) role in delaying tender offers, that is scarcely any justifica-
tion at all. 125 
119. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. 
120. See notes 70·74 supra and accompanying text. 
121. See Part I supra. 
122. See notes 14448 infra and accompanying text. 
123. Cf Gilson, supra note 2, at 868-70 (arguing in favor of rules that would permit defensive 
tactics limited to the threat or success of securing a higher offer). Of course, one would presuma-
bly want to guard against management's self-interest by prescribing a maximum period of delay. 
124. See notes 143-47 infra and accompanying text; see also notes 150-52 infra and accompa-
nying text (discussing symbolic value of legal rules regarding target management resistance). 
125. Proponents of target litigation might suggest an additional argument in its favor: target 
lawsuits help enforce legal rules that presumably embody societal goals. Thus, even assuming 
that litigating managers have impure motives, see note 35 supra and accompanying text, nnd that 
target lawsuits diminish shareholder wealth and impose significant costs on society, see notes 
144-54 infra and accompanying text, target litigation, some would argue, can be socially vnlunble 
as a means of enforcing the law. See Yablon, Contention Disclosure and Corporate Takeovers. 6 
CARDOZO L. REV. 429, 429-30 (1985). This, of course, is a variant of the familiar argument 
favoring standing for private attorneys general: a plaintiff's self-interest in prosecuting n claim 
vigorously can serve society's interests by furthering the policies that underlie the legal rule the 
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4. Are There Other Benefits of Target Litigation? 
Commentators who support takeover defensive measures some-
times argue that certain measures are justifiable attempts to prevent 
bidders from either "raiding"126 the target or exploiting the "pris-
oner's dilemma"127 that often confronts target shareholders. Gregg 
plaintiff invokes. See generally Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as 
moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REv. 317 
(1914); see also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970); Newman v. Piggie Park 
Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 61 VA. L. REv. 553 (1981); 
Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the Williams Act After Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled 
Waters, 34 Bus. LAW. 117 (1978). To put this somewhat differently and more specifically, target 
litigation could be preferred as a means of promoting auctions, on the ground that target man-
agement will succeed in thwarting a takeover through a legal victory only where, by hypothesis, 
there is something illegal about the takeover effort. 
There are at least two responses that may be made to this "private attorneys general" defense 
of target litigation. First, it is arguably the obligation of target management to promote the 
target shareholders' interests, rather than the interest of the public generally, in responding to a 
tender offer. Second, and more broadly, where private enforcement of the law exacts siguificant 
costs that may be avoided without sacrificing the law's objectives, the private attorney general 
notion seems less compelling. See notes 176-94 infra.and accompanying text. This is particularly 
true if one suspects that the claims asserted by a particular class of private attorneys general are 
often without merit. See notes 13, 16, 28 & 29 supra. In any event, partly because of the poten-
tially valuable private enforcement that target lawsuits can provide, I stop far short of proposing 
a ban on all target litigation. Rather, I merely suggest reforms that would recoguize manage-
ment's self-interest in this setting and thereby reduce the risks that currently inhere in such 
litigation. See Part III infra. 
126. "Raiding" is the expropriation of target shareholder wealth through the acquisition of 
control over the target's resources for less than their fair market value. See, e.g., Camey, Share-
holder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary 
Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 341, 349 (1983); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile 
Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 249, 307-09 (1983); see also Bradley & 
Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1409. But see note 128 infra. 
127. The "prisoner's dilemma" in takeover situations is a function of the uncoordinated 
wealth-maximizing decisions that individual target shareholders make. Individual shareholders, 
acting in their self-interest and unable either to communicate or enforce agreements with fellow 
shareholders regarding their responses to a tender offer, may take action that reduces both their 
wealth and that of the other shareholders. Suppose, for example, a firm with 100 shares of 
common stock outstanding with a market price of $40 per share, or a total market value of 
$4000. Assume that a bidder offers $50 per share for 51 shares and $20 per share for the remain-
ing 49 shares (a "front-end loaded, two-tier bid"), with the condition that the bid will be with-
drawn if fewer than 51 shares are tendered. Under these circumstances, if the bid is successful, 
the bidder will acquire the target firm for $3530, which is less than its current value. Yet if target 
shareholders have homogeneous expectations, then each shareholder (acting independently) will 
tender in order to maximize his wealth: if he tenders, his wealth will be unaffected (if fewer than 
51 shares are tendered), increase by $10 per share (if exactly 51 shares are tendered) or (at the 
extreme) decrease by $4.70 per share (ifall 100 shares are tendered); ifhe holds, his wealth will 
either be unaffected (if fewer than 51 shares are tendered) or decrease by $20 per share (if at least 
51 shares are tendered). In other words, in an unsuccessful offer, an individual shareholder's 
wealth will be unchanged whether or not he tenders. In a successful offer, his wealth loss will be 
$20 per share if he holds but at most $4.70 per share if he tenders. Since the decision of any 
single shareholder will not affect the outcome of the offer, the wealth-maximizing decision for 
each shareholder is to tender. As a result, the bid will succeed, even though all target sharehold-
ers would be better off if none tendered. 
The example assumes that the price of target shares will remain at its pre-offer level if the bid 
is withdrawn. Empirical studies support this assumption. See authorities cited at note 97 supra. 
In addition, for simplicity I have omitted discussion of shareholder heterogeneity, coordination 
games that shareholders may play in these circumstances, and the impact oflegal rules on front-
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Jarrell seems to rely on these arguments to defend his thesis that litiga-
tion is consistent with the interests of target shareholders. Thus, he 
claims that litigation enables target managers to preclude bidders from 
manipulating the prisoner's dilemma to gain control of the target's as-
sets for something less than their fair value. 128 Indeed, he asserts that 
litigation "can be the most efficient means" 129 of solving the prisoner's 
dilemma. I disagree. 
First, Jarrell's concern with corporate raiding may be unjustified. 
The notion that bidders can gain control of targets with value-decreas-
ing offers130 is inconsistent with a competitive acquisitions market; 
competition in the market for corporate control should (in theory) 
protect target shareholders from bids that are successful at less than 
"the best takeover price."131 Existing empirical evidence tends to sup-
port this hypothesis: studies show that target shares (including, it is 
important to note, those that are not purchased by the bidder) gener-
ally reflect significant capital gains as a result of successful tender of-
fers.132 There is no evidence to support the claim that bidders acquire 
targets through value-decreasing offers. 
end loaded, two-tier bids. For discussion of those refinements, and why they would not alter the 
example significantly, see Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1391-93, 1397 n.68, 1415; see 
also M. Bradley & E. Kim, The Tender Offer as a Takeover Device: Its Evolution, The Free 
Rider Problem, and the Prisoner's Dilemma 18-26 (rev. ed. Apr. 1985) (unpublished working 
paper); Jensen & Ruback, supra note 35, at 31-32. See generally M. SHUBIK, GAME THEORY 
AND RELATED APPROACHES TO SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1964). 
128. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 156-57. His argument, essentially, is that litigation effectively 
provides for centralized decisionmaking with respect to tender offers: if management's lawsuit is 
a show-stopper, then obviously target managers have a veto power over the hostile bid; but even 
if the lawsuit is used only to delay the bid, that can benefit shareholders by eliciting higher offers. 
See notes 78-79 & 85 supra and accompanying text. 
While Jarrell does not expressly mention corporate raiding, his concern with that possibility 
is implicit in his discussion of the prisoner's dilemma. Thus, his example describes a situation in 
which a bidder exploits the atomistic wealth-maximizing decisions of target shareholders to ac-
quire the target for an effective price of $15 per share, despite the assumed availability of an offer 
worth $17 per share. Since he does not specify the target's pre-offer value, we cannot conclude 
that an acquisition price of $15 per share represents a "raid," as that term is commonly under-
stood. See note 126 supra. Nevertheless, his point is that by solving the prisoner's dilemma, 
litigation ensures that the bidder will not acquire the target for less than "the best takeover 
price." Jarrell, supra note 4, at 156. If we think of "raiding" offers somewhat more broadly, to 
refer to bids that are value-decreasing relative either to the target's pre-offer market value or to 
some readily available value-increasing reallocation of the target's resources, then Jarrell may be 
understood to make the claim that I attribute to him. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, 
at 1418-21 & n.154 (discussing broader notion of corporate raiding). 
129. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 157 (emphasis added). 
130. See note 126 supra. 
131. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 156. 
132. See, e.g., Bradley, Desai & Kim, supra note 71; Jensen & Ruback, supra note 35; Jarrell 
& Bradley, supra note 78; Bradley, Inter.firm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Co11tro/, 
53 J. Bus. 345 (1980). Concededly, these studies show only that target firms are not generally 
acquired for less than their pre-offer value. Thus, they do not actually refute Jarrell's claim that 
the prisoner's dilemma allows bidders to acquire targets for less than the "best" price. See note 
128 supra. But even assuming arguendo that competition alone does not solve the prisoner's 
October 1986] Target Litigation 139 
On the other hand, Michael Bradley and I have observed elsewhere 
that competition among potential bidders may not be sufficient to pro-
tect target shareholders from value-decreasing acquisitions. 133 Essen-
tially, we note that the incentives of firms to compete in the market for 
corporate control may be less than those that typically operate in 
other competitive markets. In most markets rents are competed away 
over time, and actors are induced to bid against one another in order 
to capture these rents in the short term. In the market for corporate 
control, where competition generally involves a series of revised bids, a 
potential competitor may be outbid without ever having purchased 
any target shares, and therefore without ever having captured any 
rents. Since the result of competition in this market may be to deprive 
all competitors (even the ultimate winner) of any of the gains from 
acquiring control of the target, 134 the incentives to compete may be 
significantly reduced, particularly given the nontrivial expense of re-
vising a bid.135 
Do these observations about competition in the market for corpo-
rate control suggest that Jarrell may be right after all? I think not. 
What they do suggest (as Bradley and I argue) is that mechanisms 
other than competition may be required to protect target shareholders. 
But of those that come to mind, allowing target managers to litigate 
seems the least desirable, in part because of the costs involved (both 
direct and indirect), 136 and in part because litigation, unlike other 
mechanisms one can imagine, often imposes on target shareholders the 
wealth-decreasing effects of remaining independent. 137 
For example, one might solve the prisoner's dilemma by adopting 
rules that allow target shareholders to tender either "approvingly" or 
"disapprovingly," with success of the bid dependent upon tender of a 
dilemma, it does not follow that litigation is "the most efficient means" of doing so. See notes 
136-43 infra and accompanying text. 
133. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1415-16; see also Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defen-
sive Stock Repurchases and the Appraisal Remedy, 96 YALE L.J. 322, 334-35 (1986). 
134. On the other hand, even a losing bidder will capture some rents if it has "hedged" by 
purchasing target shares in the open market; such shares can be sold at a profit to the winning 
bidder. See Gilson, supra note 94, at 53-54; Gilson, supra note 2, at 871-72; Bebchuk, supra note 
10, at 1034-38; see also STUDY OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, supra note 19, table 9 (reporting 
average pre-offer target holdings of 18% by any-or-all bidders, 5% by two-tier bidders, and 12% 
by partial bidders in the period 1981 through 1984). 
135. See also Carney, supra note 94, at 50 (arguing that "sunk cost" problems may deter 
entry of subsequent bidders); Leebron, supra note 94, at 196-97 (arguing that budgetary con-
straints and possibility of sequential auctions may reduce the incentive of a potential bidder to 
compete for control of a particular target). 
136. See notes 104-08 & 114-23 supra & notes 149-53 infra and accompanying text. 
137. See notes 70-75, 97-98 & 119-21 supra and accompanying text; see also notes 144-48 
infra and accompanying text (arguing that litigation often impedes efficient reallocations of target 
assets). 
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certain number of "approving" tenders. 138 As Lucian Bebchuk has 
argued, this would disable bidders from exploiting the pressures and 
distortions to which target shareholder decisions are currently sub-
jected without preventing value-increasing bids from reaching the 
shareholders.139 Moreover, the costs of such a mechanism would al-
most certainly be less than those associated with target litigation. 140 
Alternatively, allowing target managers to make self-tender offers 
in response to hostile bids would, if subject to certain conditions, facil-
itate the defeat of value-decreasing bids without empowering manag-
ers to veto value-increasing offers.141 Again, this mechanism appears 
to involve significantly less expense than litigation.142 
In sum, even if one believes that the prisoner's dilemma poses a 
real problem in takeover situations, that does not appear to justify tar-
get litigation. The presumed benefits of litigation can be better and 
more cheaply accomplished through other means. 143 
5. The Social Cost of Target Lawsuits 
Thus far I have considered mainly the direct expense of litigation. 
Arguably, the more serious drawback to target lawsuits is the social 
cost they can impose. I conclude this Part by turning briefly to a dis-
cussion of that cost. 
As a general proposition, competitive markets facilitate the alloca-
tion of resources to their highest-valued uses. Some commentators see 
takeover battles as a particular illustration of this principle. They view 
the hostile tender offer as a transaction in the competitive market for 
corporate control, in which managers of the bidding and target firms 
vie for the right to control allocation of the target's assets. 144 Under 
138. See, e.g., Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing, Exchange Act Release No. 21079, [1984 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 86,637, at 86,919 (June 21, 1984); Bebchuk, supra 
note 59, at 1747-88. 
139. Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 1747-55. 
140. The direct costs of this mechanism seem relatively small, see id. at 1748-49, and it would 
impose none of the social costs that can arise from unfettered litigation by self-interested target 
managers. See notes 144-54 infra and accompanying text. 
141. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1412-28 (arguing that allowing defensive 
self-tenders, subject to requirements that they be nondiscriminatory and for no fewer than the 
number of shares being sought by the bidder, assures that control-winning bid will be made by 
management team that can maximize the value of the target). 
142. See Bebchuck, supra note 59, at 1742-44; notes 144-54 infra and accompanying text. 
143. See also Carney, supra note 126 (proposing use of fair-price charter amendments as 
lowest-cost response to value-decreasing two-tier bids). 
144. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1408-12; Jensen & Ruback, supra note 
35, at 6; Bradley, supra note 132. These commentators recognize that the gains that accrue to 
target shareholders, see note 88 supra and accompanying text, may derive from any of a number 
of sources; they do not assume that tender-offer gains generally result from the ouster of ineffi-
cient or self-dealing target managers (although they acknowledge that that may be true occasion-
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such a view, two conclusions follow: (1) an important function of 
takeover activity is to promote an efficient allocation of corporate re-
sources; and (2) that function cannot be performed unless the competi-
tion between rival management teams is a fair one. 145 
Target litigation can undermine this fair competition by conferring 
a significant advantage on target managers in control contests with 
outside bidders.146 Significantly, no safeguard prevents target manag-
ers from using litigation to block value-increasing offers. Thus, we 
have already seen how self-interested managers may sue in order to 
retain their control of the target, even where a successful bid would 
plainly move the target's assets to a higher-valued use. 147 Alterna-
tively, target managers may sue one bidder in order to facilitate an 
inferior offer from a competing bidder who promises the managers 
side payments or a more attractive deal. 148 The social cost of either 
result is substantial, for both produce suboptimal allocations of the 
target's resources. Requiring target managers to comply with stan-
dards that would address their conflict of interest might go a long way 
toward reducing this cost. 
ally). Instead, they favor a "general synergy theory," to the effect that the sources of takeover 
gains (e.g., economies of scale and scope, combination of complementary resources, exploitation 
of market power) may vary from one transaction to the next. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra 
note 3, at 1409-11 (discussing alternative sources of takeover gains and rejecting notion of a 
general theory explaining tender offers); Gilson, supra note 2, at 853, 873-74; Bebchuk, supra 
note 10. 
145. As Michael Bradley and I have argued, "fair competition among rival management 
teams can prevent acquiring firms from effecting value-decreasing takeovers and target managers 
from defeating value-increasing acquisitions." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1411. 
146. Numerous courts have noted that target lawsuits against bidders can significantly tip 
the competitive balance in takeover battles. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 
F.2d 47, 60 (2d Cir. 1985); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 269 (2d Cir. 1984); 
Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Intl., Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 715 (5th Cir. 1984); Liberty Natl. Ins. Hold-
ing Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 566 (11th Cir. 1984); Equity Oil Co. v. Consolidated Oil & 
Gas, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 507, 511, 514 (D. Utah 1983); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. 
Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Standard Metals Corp. v. Tomlin, 503 F. Supp. 586, 603 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Gateway Indus. v. Agency Rent A Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92, 101 (N.D. Ill. 
1980). Relevant portions of these opinions are quoted at note 29 supra. 
For recent decisions discussing more generally the importance of an "even playing field" in 
corporate control contests, see Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (en-
joining target managers from attempt to exempt leveraged buyout proposal from appraisal provi-
sions, on ground that exemption would unfairly disadvantage competing interfirm bidder); 
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 283 (2d Cir. 1986) (enjoining 
"lock-up option" on ground that it inappropriately favored one bidder); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) (same with respect to "no-shop" provi-
sion). 
For the argument that advantaging one management team in a control contest contravenes 
the neutrality principle embodied in the Williams Act, see Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, 
at 1406-08. 
147. See notes 70-75 & 119-21 supra and accompanying text; cf Bradley & Rosenzweig, 
supra note 3, at 1421-27 (proposing safeguards that would prevent target managers from using 
defensive self-tender offers to defeat value-increasing acquisitions). 
148. Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 1743. 
142 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:110 
In addition, maintaining the status quo with respect to target liti-
gation may impose a different, equally troubling cost on society. I 
have suggested that litigious target managers have complex motiva-
tions, but that management's self-interest in takeover settings can be 
overwhelming. 149 For example, managers can convince themselves in 
good faith that preserving the target's independence is in the best in-
terests of its shareholders.150 Similarly, they may readily accept the 
advice of lawyers to sue a bidder, without carefully scrutinizing the 
merits of the legal claims they intend to assert. 151 In both cases, the 
managers' belief that they are acting properly and in their sharehold-
ers' interests may be mistaken, because they may be responding (even 
if to some extent unknowingly) to the understandably strong urge to 
prevent their own ouster. The law can play an important role in this 
setting by reducing the likelihood that managers will make such mis-
takes. Conversely, there is significant symbolic value in legal rules 
that permit (or inadequately discourage) such conduct; managers may 
take comfort that society, through its legal order, supports their deci-
sion to resist takeovers through litigation.152 
The cost thus imposed by current law is substantial, not only be-
cause it permits managers to behave in a self-regarding way, but also 
because it represents a missed opportunity to signal clearly to manag-
ers that society disfavors self-interested behavior. There may be other 
self-interested corporate conduct that legal rules cannot as effectively 
police. 153 Given the inherent limitations of legal rules, the regulation 
of undesirable conduct that is within the law's reach can be useful for 
communicating society's disapproval to those who operate beyond the 
law's compass. By inadequately moderating the conflict of interest 
that influences litigious target managers, we squander one opportunity 
to communicate such a message, perhaps at the same time tempting 
managers to behave self-interestedly in other settings. The resulting 
cost to society, while difficult to reckon in economic terms, may be 
considerable. 
Accordingly, quite apart from the harm that target litigation can 
149. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. 
150. See note 108 supra and accompanying text. 
151. See notes 8 & 12-16 supra and accompanying text. But see note 23 supra (discussing 
counsel's ethical obligation to reject groundless litigation). 
152. See notes 155-57 infra and accompanying text (describing current judicial attitude to-
ward takeover defensive measures, including target litigation). Moreover, the mentality that law-
yers have helped to create regarding antitakeover lawsuits arguably reinforces this belief in target 
managers. See notes 8 & 12-16 supra and accompanying text. But see note 23 supra. 
153. For example, transfer sales between parent and subsidiary corporations in which prod-
ucts are purchased at below-market prices or sold at above-market prices. See Bradley & Rosen-
zweig, supra note 3, at 1412 n.129. 
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cause target shareholders and society by impeding value-increasing 
takeovers, 154 I favor legal rules that would respond to management's 
conflict of interest and reduce its temptation to sue bidders without 
carefully determining that a lawsuit is actually justified. I discuss sev-
eral such rules below, in Part III. 
III. MITIGATING LITIGIOUS TARGET MANAGEMENT'S CONFLICT 
OF INTEREST: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
The courts have generally held that target managers are entitled to 
the protections of the business judgment rule when implementing take-
over defensive measures; so long as managers act in good faith and 
with a rational business purpose, resisting a hostile tender offer will 
not subject them to liability for breach of their fiduciary obligations.155 
This general proposition has been applied to a number of specific de-
fensive responses, 156 including target litigation.157 Thus, existing legal 
rules encourage target lawsuits by insulating litigious target managers 
154. See notes 14448 supra and accompanying text. 
155. See, e.g., Rado! v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 256-57 (6th Cir. 1985); Panter v. Marshall 
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-95 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. 
v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380-84 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 
F.2d 690, 701-04 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); see also authorities cited at note 1 supra. But see Hanson Trust PLC 
v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781F.2d264 (2d Cir. 1986) (invalidating grant of lockup option 
as breach of directors' fiduciary duties); Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 
(7th Cir. 1986) (affirming injunction against enforcement of shareholder rights plan adopted by 
target management); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(narrowing circumstances in which business judgment rule will apply to takeover defenses); Min-
star Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (shifting to target 
managers burden of showing propriety of defensive tactics in certain circumstances); Heckmann 
v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985) (affirming issuance of preliminary 
injunction against recipient of "greenmail"); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (holding that management's grant oflock-up option to one of two 
competing bidders constituted breach of fiduciary duty); Packer v. Yampol, No. 8432 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 18, 1986) (LEXIS, State library, Del. file) (holding that directors undertaking action that 
increased likelihood of continued incumbency are not disinterested); Good v. Texaco, Inc., No. 
7501 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 1985) (LEXIS, State library, Del. file) (holding that burden is on target's 
board to show good faith in connection with stock repurchase undertaken in face of possible 
control contest). 
156. See, e.g., Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Intl., Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984) ("springing 
warrants"); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.) (sale of and lock-up option 
on treasury stock), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 587 F. 
Supp. 1248 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (open market stock repurchases plus issuance of new preferred stock 
and sale of crown jewel), ajfd., 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985); Pogo Producing Co. v. Northwest 
Indus., No. H-83-2667 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (self-tender 
offer); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982) (counter tender 
offer); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (discriminatory self-
tender offer); Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (share purchase rights 
plan). 
157. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1092 (1981); Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 533 F. Supp. 1385 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Berman v. 
Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro 
Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
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from liability for fiduciary breach. Target shareholders who lose sub-
stantial takeover premiums because of successful litigious defenses158 
have little legal recourse against their managers. 
Some commentators have responded by arguing that target man-
agement's conflict of interest in control contests should preclude appli-
cation of the business judgment rule and bar some1s9 or all 160 takeover 
defenses. Writing without the benefit of Gregg Jarrell's work, all of 
these commentators who mention target litigation claim (without ex-
tended discussion) that it should be prohibited. 161 My analysis leads 
me to be sympathetic with this conclusion: litigation by takeover 
targets can adversely affect target shareholder wealth162 and exact sig-
nificant social costs.163 Its asserted benefits, moreover, are largely illu-
sory.164 Accordingly, one can readily understand why some would 
deny target managers165 standing to assert claims against hostile 
bidders. 
Nevertheless, I believe that a flat prohibition of target litigation 
would be dangerously (and needlessly) radical. Thus, even assuming 
that target managers are often inappropriate plaintiffs and that man-
agement-asserted claims frequently tend to be frivolous, hostile bid-
ders do sometimes violate the law and thereby inflict real harm on the 
target firm or its shareholders.166 If we bar direct target actions 
against the bidder, who will protect the target and its shareholders 
against such truly illegal conduct? More broadly, if we eliminate 
targets as plaintiffs, can we look to other private plaintiffs to help en-
force the law?167 
One possible answer is to rely on actions by target shareholders. 
Shareholder litigation, however, is fraught with problems of its own. 
First, shareholder actions (whether direct or derivative)168 may in-
158. See notes 70-75, 97-98 & 120-21 supra and accompanying text. 
159. See Bebchuk, supra note 10; Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Of-
fers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); Cohn, supra note 16; Gilson, supra 
note 2; Gilson, supra note 94. 
160. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 93; 
Schwartz, supra note 10. 
161. Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1029; Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 1743; Easterbrook & Fis-
chel, supra note 2, at 1192-94; see also Gilson, supra note 2, at 878-79; Leebron, supra note 94, at 
217-19. 
162. See notes 97-98 & 120-22 supra and accompanying text. 
163. See notes 144-54 supra and accompanying text. 
164. See notes 95-143 supra and accompanying text. 
165. See note 11 supra. 
166. See, e.g., authorities cited at note 36 supra. 
167. See note 125 supra. 
168. Both the common law, see, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534-35 (1970), and 
modem state corporation codes, see, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 626 (McKinney 1986); DEL. 
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volve conflicts of interest that are at least as intractable as those that 
infect actions by target managers. Thus, because the law has re-
sponded to the "free-rider" problem of shareholder litigation by per-
mitting the recovery of attorneys' fees and expenses in actions that 
confer a benefit on the corporation in question, 169 the incentive to 
CODE ANN. § 327 (1983); MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT§ 7.40 (1986), authorize shareholders to sue 
derivatively on behalf of their corporation to redress corporate injuries. See also FED. R. C1v. P. 
23.1. While we usually think of derivative actions as a means of enforcing management's fiduci-
ary obligations, see, e.g., Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in 
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1986); Coffee, 
The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LA w & CoN-
TEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5 [hereinafter Coffee, Unfaithful Champion]; Scott, Corporation 
Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983); 
Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is 
Not Working, 42 Mo. L. REV. 215 (1983) [hereinafter Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney 
General]; Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal 
for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Part VII (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1986) [hereinafter 
ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT], they have always been available for the assertion of 
claims against third parties as well. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 
244 U.S. 261 (1917); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903); Hawes 
v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882). It is therefore clear that target shareholders can use derivative 
actions to assert legal claims on the company's behalf against hostile bidders. See generally ALI 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra, § 7.07. 
Of course, it is axiomatic that shareholders may bring derivative actions only to vindicate 
rights belonging to the corporation. See generally w. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 
896-99 (5th ed. unabr. 1980); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 360 (3d ed. 1983); ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, 
supra, § 7.01. Shareholders asserting their own personal rights must do so in direct actions. See, 
e.g., Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, 451 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1971); Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 
230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956); Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co., 405 Pa. 142, 173 
A.2d 319 (1961). 
Since certain acts may simultaneously injure a corporation and impair the rights of its share-
holders, in practice the distinction between derivative and direct actions is often unclear. See, 
e.g., Snyder v. Epstein, 290 F. Supp. 652, 655 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum 
Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 15-16, 99 A.2d 236, 241 (1953); Borak v. J.I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838, 844-
45 (7th Cir. 1963), affd., 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964). Nevertheless, the claims that targets cur-
rently bring directly generally allege corporate injury; if they did not, target standing would be 
more problematical. (Indeed, courts that deny targets standing to assert Williams Act claims 
often base their decisions on the implicit view that the Williams Act protects target shareholders, 
not the target itself or its managers. See, e.g., Liberty Natl. Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 
F.2d 545, 558-59 (I Ith Cir. 1984); Equity Oil Co. v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 
507 (D. Utah 1983); Leffv. CIP Corp., 540 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Marshall Field & Co. 
v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); First Ala. Bancshares Inc. v. Lowder, [1981 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1f 98,015 at 91,249 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Gateway Indus. v. 
Agency Rent A Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Sta-Rite Indus. v. Nortek, Inc., 494 
F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 490 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y.), 
modified, 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Nicholson File Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 341 F. Supp. 508 
(D.R.I. 1972), affd., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973).) Accordingly, most of these target claims 
would be viewed as derivative if asserted by shareholders. Moreover, even if an action were less 
obviously derivative (for example, an action for Williams Act violations), unless it unambigu-
ously asserted rights that were exclusively personal to the shareholders, the shareholder plaintiffs 
could choose to bring either a direct or a derivative action or both simultaneously. See, e.g., W. 
CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra, at 898; ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra, § 7.01 
reporter's note 6. 
169. See, e.g., Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Assn., 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 
(1960); Denney v. Phillips & Buttorff Corp., 331 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1964); Tanzer v. Huffines, 
345 F. Supp. 279 (D. Del. 1972). See generally Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's 
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bring shareholder suits belongs more to the plaintiff's lawyer than the 
plaintiff himself. As a consequence, the relevant private enforcer in 
shareholder actions is someone whose interests may be adverse to the 
very shareholders he nominally represents.17° Plaintiff's attorney, for 
example, may be induced to accept collusive settlement of a claim that 
effectively trades a low corporate recovery for a high fee award. 171 
Moreover, lawyers may find it in their interest to assert frivolous 
claims entirely for their settlement value (the familiar "strike suit"). 172 
Recall that I criticized target lawsuits partly on the ground that 
management's conflict of interest can cause it to litigate principally for 
tactical reasons, resulting in the frequent assertion of meritless claims 
against bidders. The foregoing analysis suggests that the lawyer, the 
real plaintiff in shareholder suits, is influenced by his own conflict of 
interest and may also find the temptation to assert frivolous claims 
irresistible. As a result, one might legitimately question whether 
shareholder actions represent a superior means of enforcing legal 
claims against bidders.173 
Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1939); Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stock-
holder's Derivative Suits, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 574 (1942); Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' 
Derivative Suits, 47 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 (1947); Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" 
Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REV. 658 (1956); Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities 
Class Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J. CoRP. L. 267 (1978); Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in 
Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473 (1981); Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General, 
supra note 168; W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 168, at 938-43; ALI CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 168, § 7.18 comment a. The most recent draft of the ALI Corpo-
rate Governance Project describes as "widely accepted" the following explanation for the rule 
regarding attorneys' fees and expenses: 
Because individual shareholders would find it infeasible to organize and tax themselves the 
costs necessary for a successful action, the well-established rule that a successful plaintiff 
may look to the corporation for reimbursement of his fees and expenses is a precondition to 
an effective litigation remedy. In effect, this rule represents the common law's efficient solu-
tion to the well-recognized "free rider'' problem that arises whenever an individual must 
incur costs to benefit a group of which he is a member. Unless some mechanism exists by 
which to allocate these costs among the group in proportion to the respective benefits to be 
received, the individual (here, the plaintiff shareholder) has an inadequate incentive to 
proceed. 
Id. at 224-25. 
170. See, e.g., Fischel & Bradley, supra note 168, at 271 (noting that plaintiff's attorney "has 
very little incentive to consider the effect of the action on [the] shareholders, the supposed benefi· 
ciaries, who ultimately bear the costs"); Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General supra note 
168, at 232 ("[T]he plaintiff's attorney is subject to a serious conflict of interest •.• , "). See 
generally Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 168; F. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT RE· 
GARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944). 
171. See generally Garth, Nagel & Plager, Empirical Research and the Shareholder Deril'ative 
Suit: Toward a Better-Informed Debate, LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS., Summer 1985, at 137. 
172. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966); see also Coffee, 
Unfaithful Champion, supra note 168, at 13, for an economic analysis of why lawyers find it 
worthwhile to bring frivolous actions. See generally Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attor-
ney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and 
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986). 
173. For proposals designed to align more closely the interests of derivative and class action 
lawyers and their clients, see ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 168, § 7.18 
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In addition, a rule barring target lawsuits but permitting actions by 
target shareholders would cause unnecessary conceptual strain. For 
example, how, under such a rule, would courts treat lawsuits in which 
the plaintiff-shareholder is also a manager? In certain such cases, it 
may be obvious that the "shareholder" action is a spurious attempt to 
circumvent the rule barring management suits,174 but in other cases 
making that judgment would be more difficult.17s 
Similarly, it is not clear that a rule barring management suits 
against bidders could effectively prevent managers from finding a 
third-party plaintiff to sue on their behalf. However the rule might be 
phrased, it seems certain that some covert system of signals would be 
available by which management could secure the services of a plain-
tiff's attorney (or, perhaps more likely, an institutional law firm that 
could find a group of shareholders to "protect"). 
A more promising avenue of reform, therefore, might be to con-
tinue to permit management suits, but to subject litigious target man-
agers to certain rules designed to mitigate their self-interest. One such 
solution, for example, might be to outlaw all defensive responses ex-
cept litigation.176 Under such a regime, target lawsuits would be less 
useful tactically, since delay would no longer afford managers the op-
portunity to erect other barriers against takeover.177 Thus reducing 
the tactical value of litigation might decrease the incidence of meritless 
suits11s and also significantly disable managers from successfully re-
sisting premium tender offers.179 Moreover, this approach would pre-
serve the target's ability to prevent or redress truly illegal conduct by 
bidders.180 
But this modified "rule of passivity"181 would not entirely elimi-
comment g; Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General, supra note 168; Coffee, Unfaithful 
Champion, supra note 168. 
174. Cf Piper v. Chris·Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (denying bidder standing, qua target 
shareholder, to sue competing bidder for damages under § 14(e) of the Williams Act). 
175. At a certain level of share ownership, for example, it would be hard to argue that a 
shareholder who happens also to be a manager should be barred from asserting a claim qua 
shareholder. 
176. Cf Baron, supra note 10, at 342 (proposing ban on all defensive measures); Easterbrook 
& Fischel, supra note 2, at 1198 (same); Gilson, supra note 2, at 878-79 (proposing ban on all 
defensive measures except those that might facilitate an auction for the target's shares); Bebchuk, 
supra note 10, at 1029 (same). 
177. See notes 4+52 & 75 supra and accompanying text. 
178. See notes 13, 16, 28 & 29 supra and accompanying text. 
179. See authorities cited in note 177 supra (discussing utility of delay in resisting hostile 
bids). 
180. See note 125 supra; notes 166-67 supra and accompanying text. 
181. Cf Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 1201 (proposing a "rule of passivity" forbid-
ding management from employing any defensive tactic, including litigation). 
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nate the tactical value of litigation, 182 and even if it did, such a rule 
seems, in Professor Coffee's words, "an increasingly futile hope."183 
Moreover, it could in fact backfire. If litigation were the only tactic 
that target management could invoke to thwart tender offers, more 
barely colorable lawsuits might be brought for want of other options. 
A less extreme solution may therefore hold greater promise. 
For instance, target managers who sue hostile bidders could be de-
nied the protections of the business judgment rule184 and instead be 
required to demonstrate the compelling business purpose of their law-
suit.185 This more stringent standard would discourage managers 
from suing reflexively in an effort to thwart unwanted tender offers. 
As with the modified passivity rule described above, the result might 
be to reduce the likelihood of both frivolous litigation and the defeat of 
182. Target managers, for example, might still be tempted to sue bidders in the hope that 
their lawsuit might be a "show-stopper." See notes 36-42 supra and accompanying text. While 
the increasing reluctance of courts to enjoin tender offers (even preliminarily) makes this result 
less likely than it once was, see notes 24-31 supra and accompanying text, and while "show-
stoppers" are rare where the target's lawsuit is purely tactical, see note 43 supra and accompany-
ing text, self-interested managers would have little reason to refrain from suing. 
Similarly, other strategic considerations that induce target managers to litigate would be 
largely unaffected by the suggested passivity rule. See notes 52-60 supra and accompanying text; 
see also notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text (noting that delay, by itself, can help defeat 
unwanted bids). 
183. Coffee, supra note 23, at 15. 
184. See notes 155-57 supra and accompanying text. 
185. Or, to put this more broadly, the propriety of target suits could be judged by reference 
to management's duty of loyalty rather than its duty of care. See generally Cohn, supra note 16, 
at 498-501; Fischel, supra note 2, at 42-43; Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 47, at 925-28; see also 
Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A 
Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53, 69, 88-89 (1985) (proposing that target 
managers be required to show by clear and convincing evidence why acts designed to defeat a 
tender offer are in shareholders' best interests, but suggesting that managers able to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a potentially "reversible" defense (such as litigation) was 
invoked only as a negotiating ploy be permitted to justify their actions by demonstrating by a 
preponderance of the evidence the reasonableness of their gamble). 
Alternatively, section 6.17 of the most recent draft of the American Law Institute's Principles 
of Corporate Governance would protect director opposition to a hostile bid from injunctive or 
equitable relief upon a showing that "[a] reasonable investor would have believed that the holders 
of voting equity securities as a group would be likely .to derive a greater present economic benefit 
as a result of the board's action than as a result of the pending or proposed tender offer." PRIN-
CIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS§ 6.17(a)(2) (Ad-
visory Group Draft No. 7, 1986). The applicable standard for determining directors' personal 
liability for opposing a takeover bid would continue to be the business judgment rule. Id. § 6.18. 
Thus, as the comment to section 6.18 notes, under the ALI proposal "directors [would] have 
greater latitude in justifying their conduct if they [were] sought to be held personally liable for 
their actions ... than if their actions [were] sought to be enjoined .... " Id. at 322. 
To the extent that discouraging target suits might reduce the likelihood of litigation-induced 
auctions, see notes 44-52, 78-79 & 83-85 supra and accompanying text, a shift to one of these 
more stringent standards might seem more acceptable if accompanied by an amendment to SEC 
Rule 14e-1 providing for an extended period of management-triggered delay. See notes 116-25 
supra and accompanying text; see also note 194 infra. 
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value-increasing bids. And again, under this approach managers 
could still pursue bona fide legal claims against bidders. 
Nevertheless, courts have only recently begun to consider aban-
donment of the business judgment rule as the proper standard for eval-
uating takeover defensive measures. 186 Accordingly, at least until the 
courts demonstrate a greater willingness to subject defensive measures 
to a more rigorous test, it may make sense to consider other alterna-
tives as well. 
One broad response to target management's conflict of interest is 
suggested by Professor Coffee in his article in this issue.187 His 
proposal - to compensate terminated managers through the use of 
"golden parachutes" - would plainly reduce management's incentive 
to resist hostile takeovers (although Coffee, to be sure, sees the termi-
nation bonus as a more broadly useful mechanism for preserving man-
agers' incentive to develop firm-specific capital and safeguarding 
deferred managerial compensation).188 
Coffee's proposal is appealing, not least because it seeks to abate 
target management's conflict of interest through positive rather than 
negative incentives.189 His skepticism regarding the effectiveness of ju-
dicial oversight of management's defensive responses is plainly justi-
fied.190 More particularly, he is surely correct that his equitable 
sharing approach would, among othei: things, lessen the burdens that 
are currently imposed by takeover litigation.191 But Coffee himself 
recognizes that the optimal response to management's urge to resist 
hostile bids is to temper management's self-interest through negative 
and positive incentives. 192 I shall therefore conclude this Article by 
briefly describing two proposals that could (perhaps in conjunction 
186. See authorities cited at note 155 supra. 
187. Coffee, supra note 23. 
188. See id. at 73-81. 
189. See id. at 106; see also Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, 4 MID-
LAND CORP. FIN. J. 6, 23-25 (1986) (arguing in favor of "golden parachutes" 11$ a contractual 
solution to conflict-of-interest problem between managers and shareholders in change-of-control 
context). 
190. Coffee, supra note 23, at 106; see also notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text. 
191. See Coffee, supra note 23, at 107. 
192. Id. at 106. Moreover, to the extent that managers placated by golden parachutes may 
be less likely to act to stimulate auctions, such provisions may impose substantial costs on target 
shareholders. While a manager with a golden parachute would be rewarded whether the com-
pany is taken over by the initial or a subsequent bidder, if the manager values the golden para-
chute more than he values control of the company he may prefer the former, since earlier 
rewards are worth more than later ones and an effort to stimulate an auction (through litigation, 
for example) could defeat the initial bid without enticing others to enter the bidding. Cf id. at 
107 (responding to claim that golden parachutes may be "indecent and even corrupting"). 
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with positive incentives of the type described by Coffee) moderate litig-
ious target managers' conflict of interest. 
First, and most basically, one could impose cash penalties on tar-
get managers who assert frivolous claims. Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure already authorizes courts to sanction lawyers 
who sign pleadings or motions that are without merit or interposed for 
an improper purpose (such as harassment or delay). 193 Enforcing a 
similar rule against target managers themselves might significantly al-
ter their strategic calculus and thereby reduce their incentive to sue 
bidders for merely tactical reasons. 194 The result, arguably, would be 
a decrease in groundless target litiga~ion and a declining use of law-
suits to resist value-increasing bids. 
Alternatively, in recognition of target management's conflict of in-
terest, managers might be required initially to finance target lawsuits 
out of their own funds, with reimbursement or indemnification avail-
able from the corporation upon a showing that the lawsuit was 
warranted. 
Of course, what these proposals and the others discussed above 
share in common is their skeptical attitude toward target litigation: 
all, in one way or another, would treat target lawsuits with greater 
suspicion than actions brought by other plaintiffs. In the final analy-
sis, taking this view of target litigation is more important than agree-
ment on one proposal or another. Currently, the costs of target 
lawsuits far outweigh their benefits, principally because of the conflict 
of interest that influences litigious target managers. Tempering that 
conflict would blunt a costly takeover defense while preserving a valu-
able means of asserting meritorious legal claims against bidders. Ulti-
mately, this would benefit not only target shareholders, but also 
society at large. 
193. See note 23 supra. Indeed, greater judicial enforcement of rule 11 would go a long way 
toward solving the problems of target litigation discussed in this article. See generally Nelken, 
Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between 
Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986); Note, Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 
23; S. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS (1985). 
194. See notes 36-61 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, since rejection of the business 
judgment rule, see notes 184-85 supra and accompanying text, would address the problem of 
frivolous target litigation only indirectly, imposing direct penalties for the filing of meritless 
claims would seem sensible even if the courts were to hold litigious managers to a higher stan-
dard. Of course, one would also want to preclude indemnification for any such penalty. See 
generally R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW§ 15.10 (1986). 
